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Turkey and the West: Bargaining for Realignment

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ABSTRACT *As the only Muslim majority secular country in its region with a pro-western democracy, Turkey is pivotal to western interests in the Middle East. However, Turkey's European Union accession negotiations are currently at a deadlock, and disparity between Turkey and the West is increasing on many critical issues. Despite its liberal market orientation, a more socially conservative Turkey is causing apprehension to its western partners. Turkey has started to drift eastward, while the West seeks to consolidate ties and establish common values. This paper offers an agent-based game theoretic model to assess the policy trade-offs that might align Turkey's interests more closely with those of its potential western partners and to determine where the impetus will come from to revive the enthusiasm of both Turkey and the EU for further integration.*

KEY WORDS: Turkish political economy, Turkish foreign policy, Turkey–Middle East, Turkey–EU; Turkey–USA; religion and politics/society, agent-based modelling

Enthusiasm for integration started on a steep uphill trajectory during the post-Cold War period. Turkey's embrace of a liberal and open market orientation encouraged the expectation that Turkey could be integrated into the liberal world order, its affinity with the West strengthened. Successful liberalization has made Turkey one of the fastest growing economies in the world, boosting Turkish confidence that it could compete with its western partners given greater opportunity.

However, rapid economic growth has not produced a scenario of modernization similar to what occurred in the West. Turkey has become more conservative and more intolerant. The convergence of the Turkish economy to liberal norms has outpaced social and cultural change (Yesilada and Noordijk 2010). The fact that racing economies are overtaking lagging polities has made Turkey and the West's relationship harder to manage. As a result, Turkey's accession to the European Union has become more problematic and is subject to a wider range of risks that can cloud a judicious assessment of Turkey's economic potential with speculative fears and suspicions.

Turkey was formally recognized as a candidate for accession to EU membership at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. Instead of initiating an irreversible process, the opening of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU in October 2005 has

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exposed many sources of contention that have stalled the process. Commitment to the process has diminished on both sides.

The stalled pace risks trapping the negotiations in a vicious circle. European reservations about enlargement have triggered disaffection in Turkey, slowing its reform process. As a result, the prospect of EU membership has lost its salience for being a catalyst for further reforms in Turkey. The stalled commitment to political reform in Turkey, in turn, affects the EU negatively. The down-phase in the Europeanization of Turkey vindicates European sceptics (Eralp 2009, 167).

The European Commission's 2011 progress report highlights gaps in Turkish compliance with European norms and procedures. Failures to attain European standards include human rights, freedom of expression, judicial transparency, corruption control, the rights of non-Muslims and gender equality.¹ The Commission's assessment reinforces a narrative that the future of Turkish integration depends on Turkey. While recognizing Turkey's regional power and its growing economic and strategic importance, the report makes clear that shortcuts to an early agreement are unlikely.

Turkish sources, on the other hand, generally locate responsibility regarding the current stalemate on the EU side. The Turkish narrative emphasizes that a recalcitrant EU has deliberately blurred the benefits of membership by making the incentives less forthcoming. Turks believe the goal posts keep moving and that the EU has started to conceive of itself increasingly as a union of identity, rather than as a stream of common projects and objectives.

The need to gain public support has increased the political costs of promoting the accession process. The increased role of popular sentiment contrasts sharply with the initiation of negotiations when support by political, intellectual and business elites drove the process.

The European sovereign debt crisis has also served to heighten divisiveness.² It has impinged on the enthusiasm of Britain, Germany and France to any future enlargement. Britain's position regarding Turkey's EU accession has moved closer to the more restrictive position of France and Germany (Yesilada 2012). Meanwhile, the EU's declining economic prospects make EU membership less appealing and far less urgent to Turkey.

Nevertheless, neither side wants to abort the process. Geopolitics even more than economics have restored salience to the process. The political crisis in the Middle East has important strategic consequences for the West, as well as for Turkey. As the West's role in the Middle East recedes, the importance of Turkey rises. Both sides can benefit from greater foreign policy co-operation.

This paper explores Turkey's alignment with the West by establishing a set of measurable inputs that will clarify policy options for the policy makers on both sides. It tries to assess the policy options that might strengthen Turkey's collaboration with the West. It investigates whether there is a basis for Turkey and the West to agree on a grand bargain that will engage Turkey in pursuing a pro-western policy for the Middle East, restoring progress on the EU accession negotiations. It also attempts to accommodate a co-ordinated response to Turkey's needs for security, access to growing markets and most importantly to technology. A bargaining model (agent-based modelling) is used to assess the policy trade-offs that might align Turkey's interests more closely with those of its potential western partners and to determine where the impetus will come from to revive the enthusiasm of both Turkey and the EU for further integration. The objective is to link

the origins of these trends to the actions of specific stakeholders in Turkish society and the outside powers.

Our model allows us to determine how behaviours and beliefs of the stakeholders emerge from their interactions. We tried to determine how collective outcomes are the result of the interactions of the players. The model allows us to focus on relationships and how collection of the parts forms the environment that gives rise to the collective behaviour of the system. From the model it becomes increasingly clear that understanding the relationships between and among the stakeholders is the main difficulty in answering questions or solving problems about collective outcome. Traditional analysis focuses on the parts as separate independent entities, whereas our analysis is about relationships among them. The model allows us to assess how the stakeholders work together to create a collective outcome. Their interactions give rise to the collective behaviour of the system.

Background

Ever since the founding of the Turkish Republic, deep divisions have existed between the periphery—the rural Anatolian population and the centre—military, the government and the urban population. The political polarization caused by Turkey's social divisions are at the heart of the issues analysed in this study, and these can be understood in the context of the conflict between religious conservatism of the hinterland and the Republican values of laicism and nationalism of the urbanized elite. This divergence was an unintended consequence of the westernization project, which started in the late Ottoman period and was institutionalized in modernization policies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that established the modern Turkish Republic as a secular state with a western orientation in 1923.

Turkey's internal debate reflects the tensions of a torn population. These tensions are the result of the manner in which modern Turkey emerged from its Islamic Ottoman foundations. To prevent Turkish identity from being submerged in a broader multi-ethnic Ottoman framework, Atatürk aimed to consolidate national unity by creating an all-inclusive Turkish identity. State control over religion was instituted to protect Turkish modernization from the perceived threat of political Islam and to transform Turkey into a modern country. Both the Islamist and Kurdish segments of the society resisted state control over religion and nationalism, and uprisings throughout the 1920s and 1930s were suppressed by the military, which became the guardian of the principles of the newly founded Republic.

After the Second World War, the former Soviet Union was perceived as a security threat by Turkey's political administration in line with the Cold War discourse of the USA. Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952. During the Cold War, the religious and Kurdish issues were both subsumed within the Cold War ideologies of conservative anti-communism and socialism. There have been early efforts but the first multi-party elections were held in 1946. Progress towards democratization was interrupted by one military intervention in 1971, two coups in 1960 and 1980 when the Turkish military intervened to protect the founding principles of the Republic.

Turgut Özal came to power in the 1983 elections that were held after the 1980 coup. During the leadership of Özal, Turkey signed structural adjustment agreements with the World Bank and the IMF, while the military espoused the concept of 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' expanding the influence of Islam in public life to shield the population from communist influences in line with the 'Green Belt' project of the United States

(Oran 2001, 27). The economic liberalism initiated during Ozal's administration had an unforeseen consequence. It enabled a new religious and conservative business class to emerge in Anatolia, referred to as the Anatolian tigers. Greater economic and political competition between the periphery and the centre resulted.

After Ozal, Islamist parties started to play an increasingly wider role in Turkish politics, gaining wider grass roots support. By 1995, Erbakan's Welfare Party was the front runner rather than a winner.³ Following the chain of events, such as civilian opposition of business organizations, labour unions, NGOs, professional organizations and academicians (Toprak 2005, 172), the military submitted a memorandum to the government on 28 February 1997, and the coalition government headed by the Welfare Party had to resign. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then the mayor of Istanbul, began to formulate a strategy to bring together both pro-Islamic forces and business organizations. He formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001, which became the successor of the Islamist Virtue Party but with one important difference.⁴ To ensure that the AKP did not share the same fate of the other Islamist parties, Erdogan reached out to the pro-business lobbies, especially the business elite in Anatolia. Voters that seek more visibility of religion in public life, defenders of Kurdish minority rights and opponents of military intervention in politics all joined the coalition (Baran 2008, 55–56).

Despite its Islamist roots, the AKP has distanced itself from the radical views of the earlier Islamist parties, declaring itself a moderate conservative party in order to garner support from all segments of society as well as the international community. It deepened its social base by spreading the economic benefits of liberalism rather than by enforcing ideological commitments of the population to Islamic beliefs (Kalaycioglu 2007). The opposition fears that the AKP may reverse this course, and reassert the primacy of Islamic values, once it firmly controls the bureaucracy.

Positioning itself as the goal setter in the country, the AKP works closely with the private sector to increase investments and to enhance national competitiveness. It took a leading role in writing legislation to facilitate Turkey's entry into the EU. It consolidated its grass-roots appeal by improving the health care system, expanding the infrastructure in rural areas and building affordable housing in cities. When the economic crisis in 2001 discredited all rival political parties, the AKP was able to mobilize discontent, and to sweep the national elections in 2002. The AKP succeeded in renewing its term both in the 2007 and 2011 national elections because its support comes from a broad social base.

To understand the conflicts within Turkish society today, the Gulen Movement, named after its founder Muhammed Fetullah Gulen, is essential. It is the largest, and most influential religious movement in Turkey, which gained influence especially after the 1980s. The Gulen Movement is an alliance of schools, universities, financial institutions, labour unions, charities, newspapers and radio stations, with no formal organizational structure. It has amassed millions of followers including students, journalists, businessmen and professionals. It represents an attempt to reconcile western sciences and economic efficiency to Islamic ethno/cultural identity. Gulen seeks not only to influence the Turkish population but also Muslims throughout the whole world. Gulen's defenders claim he is an advocate of a peaceful and non-violent way of life, democracy and civil liberty (Harrington and Tigar 2011) and that he respects the secular Turkish state and is a corrective to the dangers of reactionary Islamist extremism. Critics of Gulen warn that the moderate position is only a facade to enable the Movement to infiltrate every layer of society and government, and they believe that its real mission is to facilitate the transition

to a polity in which religion dominates the state (Sharon-Krespin 2009).⁵ Although the Gulen Movement and the AKP do not always see eye to eye, both contribute to the Turkish conservative movement.

Westernization was traditionally opposed by the Islamists in Turkey. To avoid the closure of their parties and being banned from politics several times, the Islamist politicians began a new discourse in the late 1990s, stressing democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Islamist politicians embraced a new approach, becoming pro-western in their search for new sources of legitimacy. Softening the anti-western stance of the first generation of Islamist parties of the early 1970s, they have laid claim to represent the centre of the Turkish electorate. Espousing western values helped the Islamists to acquire legitimacy in their confrontation with the secular nationalists, the military and the judiciary (Dagi 2005, 31–32).

The West has a tenuous relationship with the religious conservatives and is suspicious of the AKP's democratic credentials because it fears that the AKP's alignment with the West is only transitional, and that the AKP will eventually seek to join a global Islamic block, a project that is only beginning to take shape. The West also believes that the AKP has interfered with the independence of the press and has weakened the independence of the judiciary and the legislature.⁶

The secular nationalists, on the other hand, have been alienated by the West. They believe that the West does not grasp the danger of gradual Islamization and Kurdish separatism. They are also angered by the AKP's soft approach to the Kurdish demands for autonomy (Gordon and Taspinar 2008). They fear an eventual full western embrace of the Islamists would enable the religious parties to successfully challenge the basic principles of the Turkish Republic and weaken the state's control over religion.

There is significant potential for mistrust, friction and ultimately conflict in the triangular relationship between the West, the religious conservatives and the secular nationalists. The rift between Turkey and the West persists since the West remains suspicious of Turkey, whereas a deeply torn Turkey remains a dissatisfied member of the western alliance. All the parties, the West, religious conservatives and secular nationalists are dissatisfied and distrustful of each other.

Methodology

The primary method for achieving the objectives of this paper is the agent-based modelling, which is a game theoretic, bounded rationality model and is designed to assess the evolution of policy positions of competing interests that evolve over time. The outcome will be predictions about policy outcomes and strategic opportunities for altering them. The mathematical algorithm behind this approach can be found in Bueno de Mesquita (1997, 2002), Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1985, 1996) and Kugler and Feng (1997). A brief summary will be provided in this section.

To assess how Turkey's collaboration with the West could be strengthened, we have created preference scales on the following issues for Turkey:⁷

- preference over relationship between religion and the state
- what Turkey should promote in the Middle East
- foreign policy preference
- foreign economic relations.

Structured interviews have been undertaken with experts in Turkey on the particular issues addressed above.⁸ The agent-based model depends on the face-to-face interviews that draw upon the policy acumen of the experts. Four types of information have been collected from the experts:

- who the stakeholders are that can influence the policy outcome⁹
- what policy position they currently advocate
- what their relative potential influence over the process is
- how important the issue is to the policy maker.

The model uses the data and provides policy recommendations based on the nature of interactions among stakeholders and the types of coalitions that will form.¹⁰ It helps the policy makers to understand which policy options are likely to be successful.

The agent-based modelling is based in part on Black's median voter theorem and Banks' theorem about the monotonicity between expectations and the escalation of political disputes (Banks 1990; Black 1958). The model makes predictions based on the rational desired outcomes of the parties and their strategic interactions, not as an extension of past behaviour. This approach simulates the shifts in position of individual stakeholders over time in response to the pressure that occurs during bargaining. The actors simultaneously make proposals and exert influence on one another during the game in the model. They then evaluate options and build coalitions by shifting positions on the issue in question.

The model has the capability to assess how decision makers evaluate whether or not they will challenge policy if their expected value for an action is positive or negative. A stakeholder's probability of success depends upon its ability to influence as well as its anticipated chance of success at convincing others to support the position advocated.

The model facilitates a mapping of the relationships and perceptions of each stakeholder vis-à-vis every other stakeholder. The policy proposals and the subsequent responses begin to give insights into the process, anticipating policy dynamics and outcomes. The agent-based modelling thus provides a forecast of the likely settlement of policy issues as a function of competition, confrontation, co-operation and negotiation.

Without a guideline for the long-term interests of a nation, many actions can initially be seen as optimal that produce detrimental results over time. Differentiating between successful and unsuccessful approaches is often only possible with the benefit of hindsight. The agent-based modelling allows policy makers and policy analysts to anticipate likely consequences before they unfold.

Preference over Relationship between Religion and the State

The emergence of the Turkish nation-state was a 'complex process of acculturation to modern nationhood, both through and despite Islam' (Karpas 2001, 329). The founders wanted Turkey to be a modern western nation, but at the same time they wanted to protect it from imperialistic forces. Thus, modern Turkish nationhood is a mixture of anti-Ottomanist and anti-Islamic rhetoric combined with a search for solidarity that is founded on Ottomanism and Islamism (Karpas 2001). The tension between the needs for social solidarity built upon Islamic identity and the need for an effective modern state that can keep Turkey at the forefront of nations is a recurrent theme in debates over the role of

religion and state. Balancing Islam with the needs of modern nationhood is an ongoing concern. Our model offers considerable insight into the form this balancing is likely to take.

Strong pressures exist to move the regime towards a position in which religion dominates the state in Turkey. However, irresolvable tension is inevitable on this issue because no room exists for negotiation between those who desire to maintain the status quo (laicism) and those who advocate religion dominating the state.

To understand this issue, usage of the term laicism in the Turkish context needs clarification. Laicism does not mean secularism. The separation of state and religion, as well as freedom of religion are essential both to secularism and laicism, but whereas a secular state allows religious symbols to be displayed in public arenas, in laicist states, the separation of state and religion is strict, and the state plays a more active role in enforcing the separation (Tarhan 2011, 1). Turkish laicism (*laiklik*) was influenced by French laicism (*laïcité*) and was established after the abolishment of the Caliphate. By the foundation of the government-controlled Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) in 1924, all imams and muezzins became 'paid employees of the state' (Toprak 1995, 3591) in order to advance state dominance over religion.

Our analysis of the data considers many potential stakeholder alliances, yet in none of these does a possibility of a theocratic regime similar to that of Iran emerge, although the decline of laicism and the possibility of a more Islamist orientation in state/society relations does have direct consequences for Turkey's relationship with the West.

All the stakeholders are represented in Figure 1 but only some are labelled for the sake of clarity. All the stakeholders as well as their positions, influences and saliences have been used to calculate these results.

In Figure 1, round 1,¹¹ the government led by Prime Minister Erdogan and the Suleymanci Order are increasingly incorporating religion into government policy. The military, on the other hand, is promoting laicism.

Other than Iran and the other Middle Eastern countries, the foreign factions advocate either weak secularism or secularism and are supported by some domestic stakeholders such as the opposition parties and TUSIAD. After initial success, a reaction will set in that brings back much of the laicist character to the government but pressures to increase the presence of Islam in public life will continue.

This bargaining process continues, and two distinct groups form over time. In Figure 2, round 10, of the two major groups, laicism is supported by a coalition of domestic stakeholders and outside powers, some of which are the military, the opposition parties, Russia, the EU and the USA. Between rounds 1 and 10, the military does not give up laicism despite pressures to conform to the position of the government. The other major group, the government and the Suleymanci Order, continues favouring the position in which religion dominates the state and is joined by the Gulen Movement and the Naksibendi Order.

The simulation in Figure 3 reveals the level of the unforeseen capacity of the EU to be a game changer directly influencing the outcome of regime choice in Turkey. The outcome is surprising because the EU does not exercise as much power as does the USA, but the implication is that the USA can leverage its influence by appealing to the EU.

The simulation in round 3 (see Figure 3) shows that the EU has the capacity to alter Turkey's shift towards a position in which religion dominates the state. To prevent the




Figure 1. Bargaining for the regime—round 1.




Figure 2. Bargaining for the regime—round 10.




Figure 3. Simulation: The EU as a game changer. EU proposes to PM Erdogan and President Gul a more secular posture in round 3.

deepening of Islamic control over the state, the EU would have to propose more conducive economic terms to shift the major stakeholders in the Turkish government.

In [Figure 4](#), round 10, the outcome is a strong consolidation of secular government. The Gulen Movement will continue to advocate for a more Islamic state but the coalition of Turkish government and foreign actors will be able to overcome such demands. The USA takes a more accommodating position, however, it does not have the ability to convince Turkey to move towards a more secular posture but can reinforce Turkish pro-secular choices once they are made.

The resolution of the Cyprus issue or further accommodation on Turkish entry into the EU are possible avenues which could prompt such a move. As we will see later, Turkey is very sensitive along the economic dimension to demands from the West so trade and investment could also be avenues to prompt such an accommodation.

Although the EU can be a game changer, the consistent opposition from France and Germany make it unlikely that the EU will make an offer that is sufficiently appealing to Turkey. Both France and Germany would need to become significantly more sensitive to the role that Turkey can play, (1) as a source of influence in the Middle East, (2) as a source of markets and additional labour, (3) as a source of personnel for NATO forces, (4) as an energy corridor, (5) as a way to protect Europe from radicalism in the Muslim world and (6) a more liberal Turkey can be a source of inspiration for the Middle Eastern countries. The rule enforcement capabilities of the Turkish bureaucracy can be put at the disposal of the EU to ensure compliance with the rules and laws established in Brussels. Turkey's strong state is probably more capable of enforcing EU mandates than are weaker states like Greece and Italy. For all of the above reasons, facilitating the shift towards a more laicist and ultimately more liberal orientation would be of considerable interest to the process of Turkey's integration into the EU.

What Turkey Should Promote in the Middle East

The relationship between state and religion that PM Erdogan posited for the Middle East revealed how distinctive Turkey is from tendencies in the region. On 15 September 2011, he stated in Tunis that:

Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state of law. As for secularism, a secular state has an equal distance to all religious groups, including Muslim, Christian, Jewish and atheist people ...

Tunisia will prove to the whole world that Islam and democracy can co-exist. Turkey with its predominantly Muslim population has achieved it ...

On the subject of secularism, this is not secularism in the Anglo-Saxon or Western sense; a person is not secular, the state is secular ...

A Muslim can govern a secular state in a successful way. In Turkey, 99 percent of the population is Muslim, and it did not pose any problem. You can do the same here.¹²




Figure 4. Simulation: The EU as a game changer. EU proposes to PM Erdogan and President Gul a more secular posture—round 10.

The speech reveals how fundamentally different Turkey is from the rest of the countries in the region where Islamist movements seek to place the state under religious control. Protests against this speech were voiced by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, and it also caused friction among PM Erdogan's grass root supporters at home. But it has been taken very positively in the secular opposition circles in Turkey and the West, since it does make Turkey a more appealing partner for the West.

Religious thinking in Turkey differs from that of the rest of the Muslim world for reasons that go back to the Ottoman period. When the Ottoman Empire's decline was already clearly visible, an exhaustive search was undertaken for solutions and reforms, which produced the westernization project, under which students were sent to Europe for education. A western educated elite emerged that hoped to combine western and traditional values, but it encountered significant resistance, causing it to challenge the authority of the *ulema* (religious scholars). Members of a new intelligentsia, mainly educated in reformed schools, aspired to create a new Islamic identity, which would enable it to educate its population in modern science without making compromises to Islamic theology. The intelligentsia never abandoned its Islamic identity but sought to harness it to mobilize opposition to western imperialism (Mardin 2005): 'Later, in the 1890s, part of the intelligentsia promoted arguments that would allow Islam to be seen as the locus of progress and civilization' (Mardin 2005, 151).

But Turkey's experience is not easily transferable to the rest of the Middle East (Taspinar 2003). Unlike Middle Eastern neighbouring countries, the Turkish state arose from indigenous elements, whereas in the Middle East, the states were imposed by general non-Islamic occupying powers, such as France, Italy and Britain. Middle Easterners generally view the state as an agent of external oppression, but in Turkey the state is the basis of national unity. The Turkish form of Islam adapted itself during the late nineteenth century to supporting and legitimating a strong and independent state. This makes the Turkish state distinctive from western secularism, but also from the Middle East, where secularism is 'regarded as the most dangerous challenge to Islam' (Altunisik 2005, 51).

Heper (1992) has identified the rise of a bureaucratic state during the late Ottoman period as what separates Turkish institutions from those of the Middle East. In Turkey, a distinctive cohort of professionally trained bureaucrats who are recruited, selected and promoted on the basis of their managerial talents, governs the state. They were relatively insulated from social groups including both the religious and the business communities. The Turkish state achieved an autonomous character through bureaucratic domination by elite cadres of professional managers, making Turkey a strong state. No other state in the Middle East possesses a similar degree of autonomy from society.

Turkey's historical ties and institutional links with the West also make it different from the Middle Eastern countries. Turkey is a member of key western institutions such as NATO, the Council of Europe and OECD (Altunisik 2008, 45); it is a member of the Customs Union (CU) of the EU.

In Figure 5, round 1, the majority of the stakeholders are divided among two major groups, one at religious democracy with Islamic parties, the other one at liberal secular democracy. All religious groups other than the Suleymanci Order are with the government.

In Figure 6, round 7, the stakeholders who were not grouped with the two major groups in round 1, now make a coalition with the group favouring religious democracy with Islamic parties. The only exception is Russia, which continues to promote illiberal secular




Figure 5. What Turkey should promote in the Middle East—round 1.




Figure 6. What Turkey should promote in the Middle East—round 7.

democracy. Russia finds religious tendencies dangerous since it has always supported secular authoritarians against religious leaders in the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union. Because China does not want to be isolated, it joins the dominant coalition, advocating religious democracy with Islamic parties.

A major reason for minimal adjustments between rounds 1 and 7 is that government stakeholders are strongly committed to advocate religious democracy with Islamic parties. Because of the intensity of that commitment, the other outside powers will accept the mixture of religion and democracy. Ultimately, the outcome will be determined by local politics where the divide between laicists and supporters of a more religious state remains unresolved. Turks are fighting to determine what relationship the state and religion will have in Turkey itself. Their proposals for the Middle East are a proxy for the battle that PM Erdogan would probably want to avoid within Turkey itself.

This issue is indecisive because ultimately, it is the role of the state with or without religious democracy that will be critical in closing the gap between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries. And on this issue, PM Erdogan is interpreted to mean that Turkey will not diverge from its state traditions in order to strengthen its affinity with the Middle East.

Turkey will advocate religious democracy with Islamic parties in the Middle East. Pressures from the military along with splinter Turkish opposition groups will not alter this policy stance. Yet differences between Turkey and the aspirations of Islamic parties in the Middle East are strongly grounded in the historical differences in 'stateness'.

Foreign Policy Preference

Aiming to improve economic and diplomatic relations with the Middle East and with the Turkic nations in Central Asia, Turkish foreign policy has asserted differences with the West. Turkey's assertion of divergent foreign policy interests raises concerns that it is shifting its 'axis' away from the West.

The transformation of Turkish foreign policy is a heavily researched area. [Kirisci \(2009, 34–37\)](#) provides a brief survey of the causes of the transformation, in which he compiles five sets of explanations: (1) Europeanization; (2) identity-based approaches; (3) domestic political developments; (4) geopolitical factors after the end of the Cold War; (5) the search for soft power. Kirisci also draws attention to the role of economic factors in shaping and transforming foreign policy.

The AKP's foreign policy style is characterized by the use of soft power to develop friendly relations with all Turkey's neighbours ([Onis and Yilmaz 2009, 9](#)). [Ahmet Davutoglu \(2001\)](#), the foreign minister and the intellectual architect of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP, introduced the concept of strategic depth, in which he argued that for a long-lasting strategic perspective, historical and geographical depth need to be taken into consideration, and he highlighted the pivotal regional and global role of Turkey as a 'central power'. Davutoglu defines principles of the Turkish foreign policy as: (1) balance between security and democracy; (2) 'zero problem policy toward Turkey's neighbours'; (3) development of relations with neighbouring and distant regions; (4) adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy; and (5) rhythmic diplomacy ([Davutoglu 2007, 79–82](#)). Since the Arab Spring of 2011, the 'zero-problems with neighbours policy' no longer seems to be valid. Frictions have developed with the Syrian leadership, the central government in Baghdad and with Iran. Additionally, unresolved differences with

Israel, Armenia, Cyprus and Greece have led the AKP to reassess its potential for influencing its neighbours unilaterally.

Turkish foreign policy under the AKP has become more interconnected with domestic politics. There is also an unparalleled increase in the scale of diplomatic activity, a tendency to act independently on a number of key foreign policy issues even when this is in direct confrontation with the West, and a tendency to take sides in international disputes (such as the pro-Palestine position in the Israeli–Palestine conflict) (Onis 2011, 51). This shift seems to refute the soundness of the old equation that ‘the more Turkey renounces its eastern identity, the more chances it will have in the confirmation of its western identity’. Or alternatively, will a more pragmatic equation be that ‘the acceptance of Turkey’s placement in the West will be more likely through the strengthening of Turkey’s links to the East’ (Oguzlu 2008, 7)?

The analysis in this section shows this dichotomous formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy to be inaccurate. Despite the rhetoric, no stakeholder is seriously advocating a sharp move towards a partnership with the East and the Islamic World. The overwhelming majority of the stakeholders accept the need to continue a loose partnership with the West. Iran, the one outlier that advocates pro-Islamic foreign policy along security lines, will be rejected.

Figure 7 shows that Turkish foreign policy favours a loose partnership with the West and that this posture will be slightly strengthened. Stakeholders are scattered among three major groups in round 1, favouring balanced relations with all, loose partnership with the West or strategic partnership with the West.

In Figure 8, round 3, three dominant positions are reduced to two. The majority of the stakeholders either advocate a loose partnership with the West or a strategic partnership with the West. The hierarchy of a loose partnership with the West is unlikely to be challenged and there is no pressure to defect once the military joins in. Indeed, a consensus prevails in Turkish foreign policy because the military and the largest factions within the government are united, and since they represent the median outcome, the policy position of a loose partnership with the West dominates.

Foreign Economic Policy

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Turkey abandoned the import substitution strategy and embraced an export-oriented growth strategy with the encouragement and support of the World Bank and the IMF and in line with the rise of supply side economics in the western world. Liberalization and integration of Turkey into the world economy was achieved in phases: liberalization of domestic markets; trade liberalization in 1984; full opening of the capital account in 1989; and membership in the CU in 1996. These strategies have led to the expansion of Turkey’s foreign economic relations with the external world.

Turkey experienced two financial crises in 1994 and in 2001. The 2001 crisis adversely affected many economic indicators; GNP fell by 5.7% in real terms, consumer price inflation increased to 54.9%, the currency lost 51% of its value against the major currencies, unemployment rose steadily to 10% (Yeldan 2008) and many banks went into bankruptcy. Despite the restructuring of the economy and reforms in the banking and financial systems in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, the Turkish economy suffered seriously from the global crisis of 2008–2009. In the first quarter of 2009, a sharp decrease of 14.3%, in real GDP was experienced and unemployment reached nearly 16%. This




Figure 7. Bargaining for the foreign policy preference of Turkey—round 1.




Figure 8. Bargaining for the foreign policy preference of Turkey—round 3.

contraction in real GDP is the most severe since 1945 (Rodrik 2012, 47). Although Turkey's 8.46% GDP growth in 2011 was among the fastest in the world, it only achieved 2.2% in 2012 and Turkey's income inequality remains stubbornly higher than EU standards. The share of the highest income quintile is 46.7%, while the share of the lowest income quintile is 5.8% in 2011. Turkey's Gini coefficient for the late-2000s was 0.409, indicating far greater inequality than the OECD average of 0.316 for the same period.

The economy and trade both move Turkish foreign policy in a practical direction (Kutlay 2011). Turkey has expanded its commercial and economic relations with the Middle East, North Africa, Russia and the Turkic Republics, while keeping its economic ties with the western world.¹³ Economic considerations have increasingly been the driving force behind Turkish foreign policy (Kirisci 2009). Foreign policy, in turn, is now more closely connected with domestic concerns such as employment and wealth generation (Kirisci 2009, 39). Economic growth attained as a trading country positions Turkey as a model of economic liberalism that can encourage other Muslim populations to believe that they too can improve their material well-being through adapting liberal trade policies.

The analysis in this section reveals that a loose partnership with the West is the median choice of all stakeholders. The findings confirm that foreign policy and foreign economic policy move in parallel to one another.

In Figure 9, round 1, along with most of the domestic stakeholders, the government is between balanced economic relations with all and a loose economic partnership with the West. The Gulen Movement, the military and the speaker of Parliament, Cicek, are also advocating the same position, though slightly closer to a loose economic partnership with the West.

In Figure 10, round 4, along with key Turkish factions, the government pursues a loose economic partnership with the West. Note that in round 4, PM Erdogan shifts attempting to strengthen economic relations with the West further at the expense of his own domestic coalition. This is a pattern found in the previous assessments. Turkey is sensitive to economic pressures from the EU and can be convinced through financial offers to make concessions in related arenas.

Figure 11 simulates a weaker EU. In this case, the median choice remains a loose economic partnership with the West but a major domestic group will demand more balanced economic relations with all. For example, PM Erdogan shifts from his position of a strategic economic partnership with the West in Figure 10 to a loose economic partnership with the West in Figure 11.

Europe's declining share of the world economy reduces the appeal of the EU membership, but it also adds to Turkey's insecurity because it weakens the status that Turkey would gain from being an intermediary between the EU and the Middle East. Turkey's trade with Europe has the potential to improve the quality or value-added product range of Turkey's manufactures. Trade with less developed countries does not offer the same incentives for Turkey to increase the quality of domestic inputs into its manufacturing output. Trade with European partners requires that Turkey invests in human capital, develops research and development (R&D) and promotes innovation, as well as strengthening key institutions.¹⁴ Turkey is vulnerable to competition from low-cost producers that offer a similar product. The only way to reduce this vulnerability is to upgrade skills and labour, improve infrastructure and integrate with high value global networks. A Turkey that does not climb the value chain in its production and manufacturing will find itself more susceptible to conflict with Iran over influence in the Middle East.




Figure 9. Bargaining for foreign economic policy—round 1.




Figure 10. Bargaining for foreign economic policy—round 4.




Figure 11. Simulation: EU loses half of its influence because of Euro Area Problems.

Unforeseen Opportunities

Conventional views do not take into account the leverage that the EU currently has to shift the policy discourse in Turkey because it is assumed that the EU led by Germany and France will prevent Turkey's accession to the EU. If the EU and Turkey move further apart, Turkey's economic performance may weaken. Therefore, PM Erdogan is likely to respond if meaningful concessions are put on the table. On the way towards accession, Turkey can gain a number of meaningful advantages from closer ties.

Currently, being a member of the CU, but not being a member of the EU itself economically, disadvantages Turkey. Turkey's membership in the CU requires it to harmonize its preferential customs regime with that of the EU's potential Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Therefore, when the EU signs FTAs with third countries, Turkey must automatically open its markets to those countries due to its CU membership, but since it is not a member of the EU, Turkey cannot gain the same access to the third country markets that the EU enjoys. By being forced to allow entry without gaining the privilege of access, Turkey's competitiveness in those markets is impaired.¹⁵ Turkey must reach an agreement with the EU that in all external trade agreements, Turkey is included as a full beneficiary.

Figure 12 shows the range of agreements possible between PM Erdogan, the military and the EU. Europe is apprehensive that the Arab Spring will empower Islamist parties that are hostile to the West. The credibility of Turkey among the newly formed governments in the Middle East can be leveraged to obtain greater co-operation with European security concerns. Significant concessions from Turkey are possible if the EU, PM Erdogan and the military can reach an agreement together. A win-set is the trade-offs possible for each party to improve its utility. The area marked by the coloured dots is the win-set that defines the opportunity space where the EU could negotiate with PM Erdogan to strengthen Turkey's strategic economic partnership with the West in exchange for greater co-operation on foreign policy in the Middle East.

The question remains unanswered whether the current Euro Area crisis and the fear of further decline will make the EU more defensive, more xenophobic or alternatively more realistic, practical and more willing to negotiate. A practical EU will look for partners to help ease the recession, which makes Turkey more appealing to the EU and which gives Turkey more opportunities to gain concessions from the EU, prompting greater integration between the two economies.

Concluding Remarks

This study is designed to assess how interest group competition within Turkey influences the outward orientation of the regime. Turkey shares security concerns with the West, but collaboration and co-operation with the West would require further concessions by the West to boost Turkey's long-term economic prospects. Turkey today produces a range of products that can be replicated by a number of middle-income countries. Turkey might be willing to become more aligned with the West if it gains greater commercial and technological capacity to become a regional leader. This can be accomplished by helping Turkey to gain capability and skills to improve the value-added component of its manufacturing. To achieve such a goal, the Turkish policy makers, specifically the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Science, Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of Customs and Trade should also take the initiative and promote measures to increase the domestic portion of manufactured goods.




Figure 12. PM Erdogan expands foreign economic relations with the West.

The most surprising and compelling finding of the study is PM Erdogan's flexibility on *issue 1*, the relationship between religion and the state, and *issue 2*, what Turkey should promote in the Middle East. Although PM Erdogan's coalition is stronger in the short run, in the long run efforts to alter the status quo on religion could weaken PM Erdogan. This realization makes PM Erdogan more flexible than his public statements reveal and he recognizes that although he stands a chance of institutionalizing greater religious domination of the state today, such a victory might further polarize the Turkish polity and incite future cycles of protest, provoking renewed efforts by the opposition at redomination of the state. Stoking further conflict over the relationship between religion and the state can significantly weaken Turkey.

Although the USA has significant power in the region and in Turkish politics, the USA does not have a direct leverage on either European or Turkish leaders to overcome their reluctance to support the unpopular EU enlargement project. The critical point is that EU enlargement is equally unpopular in both Turkey and Europe, and the USA has only indirect means to overcome the stalled engagement, although it is consistent with long-term US interests to foster a common approach to international relations between Europe and Turkey. On the other hand, the EU, although less influential on overall geopolitics, can make a tangible offer in exchange for concessions that can pull Turkey much closer to the West on key policy areas such as regime structure within Turkey. The USA has only indirect means to utilize such as diplomatic channels to persuade European actors to reconsider Turkey–EU–Cyprus relations and to respect Turkey's commercial interests when the EU engages in bilateral trade talks with third parties. But the USA has few direct means of changing the construction of power or the political narrative within Turkey.

The current account deficit remains one of the greatest risks to the future of the Turkish economy. With a ratio of 9.7% to GDP in 2011, Turkey's current account deficit reached \$77.1 billion in 2011, from \$48.6 billion in 2010. Although it fell to \$45.2 billion in the first 11 months of 2012, the decline in the current account deficit was not the result of the needed structural reforms; it simply reflected the slower growth of the economy. Neither the standard instruments of macroeconomic policy nor partnerships with the East would eliminate the most important contributing factor to Turkey's trade deficit. Turkey cannot reduce its energy imports and still grow its economy. But Turkey can aspire to reducing its technological deficit and increase the percentage of its trade comprised of high value manufactured goods. This can be attained through increased integration into high value chains, which would facilitate technology transfers and knowledge spillover from learning by doing (Hausmann et al. 2011).

Greater integration into the West can be the source of the technology transfers that Turkey needs to eliminate the skills gap that is a primary cause of its balance of payment difficulties. Eliminating this gap is also vital for Turkey's security, and in this regard the relationship with the West is decisive. Partnering with western firms and importantly with universities, Turkey can scale up its technology and integrate its production into global technology networks. Greater strategic and economic alignment with the West offers Turkey the opportunity to increase the value of the products and services that Turkey offers in world markets. The long-term strategy that is most likely to yield meaningful benefits to both the Turkish economy and the social structure would be to seek membership among the global elite of countries that make the major contributions to science and technology.

A Turkey that can become the dominant economy in its region, while being solidly linked through collaboration on security, commerce and technology with the West will be

a powerful strategic asset. A strategic partnership that allocates to Turkey a larger role as a contributing partner will make both Turkey and the West stronger. Sufficient common interest exists to make this a reasonable goal for leaders on both sides. The way forward requires that policy makers of both Turkey and the West understand the interconnection between social, political and security policy.

Notes

- ¹ See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf.
- ² The global crisis has negatively affected Europe and acted as a trigger of the Euro area sovereign debt crisis.
- ³ Erbakan is known for politicizing the ideas of mainstream Islamists. He founded the National Vision (*Milli Görüş*) in 1969, which is an Islamist movement.
- ⁴ After the closure of the Virtue Party, the reformists led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan established the AKP, whereas Recai Kutan from the traditional front established the Felicity Party.
- ⁵ In 2000, Gulen was indicted for organizing an illegal terrorist organization to overthrow the secular government. The controversial trial lasted for six years in his absence because he had lived in the USA since 1999. He was acquitted on all charges in 2006. In 2008, the acquittal became official. The same year, his application for permanent residency in the USA was approved. Gulen now lives in Pennsylvania.
- ⁶ The West is not monolithic. Both the USA and the EU share these concerns.
- ⁷ See Appendix A for preference scales.
- ⁸ After initial identification of the stakeholders by the authors, the list of stakeholders was confirmed and the data were acquired with collaboration from the national experts in Turkey between mid-July and mid-August 2011.
- ⁹ See Appendix B for the stakeholders.
- ¹⁰ See Appendix C for the data.
- ¹¹ A round is a contextually defined measure of time. In the terminology of the model, a round is an exchange of information between all stakeholders. In other words, a round assumes that each stakeholder has heard the 'offers' of every other stakeholder and had time to process the relative benefits of each. The median represents the median choice of all of the stakeholders, both domestic and international. The rounds end when the next move does not entail more than 10% movement over the previous round.
- ¹² See <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=erdogan-offers-8216arab-spring8217-neo-laicism-2011-09-15>.
- ¹³ The EU is the most important trade partner of Turkey, yet the West's share in both Turkey's exports and imports has been declining in the last decade. An eastward shift reflects the diminishing prospects of increasing future trade with the West. Turkey is diversifying its trade partners to avoid the risks of depending on partners in the West whose share of global trade is shrinking. Stagnation in Turkey's trade with the West and expanding trade with developing regions is in line with the global trends, overtaking vertical North–South flows and favourable investments, capital flows and increasing trade of the emerging economies.
- ¹⁴ See the Turkish Industrial Strategy Document (2011–2014) in <http://www.sanayi.gov.tr/Files/Documents/TurkiyeSanayiStratejisiIngilizce.pdf>.
- ¹⁵ See <http://www.turkishweekly.net/print.asp?type=2&id=334>.

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
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
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Appendix A: Preference Scales


Issue 1: Preference over Relationship between Religion and State




Issue 2: What Turkey should promote in the Middle East



Issue 3: Foreign Policy Preference



Issue 4: Foreign Economic Policy



Appendix B: Stakeholders

Government

Recep Tayyip Erdogan: He is the founder and the leader of the AKP and the prime minister of Turkey since 2003. He worked for Erbakan's National Salvation and Welfare parties. He was nominated by the Welfare Party to Istanbul's mayoralty, and he served as the mayor of Istanbul between 1994 and 1998. He founded the AKP from the ashes of the Virtue Party.

Ahmet Davutoglu: Chief adviser to prime minister Erdogan since 2002, he became the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey in 2009. A PhD degree holder in Political Science and International Relations from Bogazici University, he became a full professor in 1999. His publications, mainly the *Strategic Depth* (Davutoglu 2001), have been very influential in shaping Turkey's foreign policy orientation.

Cemil Cicek: He is the speaker of Parliament. He was a member of Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party (ANAP) in the 1980s until late 1990s. He later joined the Virtue Party of Erbakan, which evolved to the AKP. From 2003 to 2007, he served as the minister of justice.

Abdullah Gul: President of Turkey and a former member of the Welfare and Virtue parties, he later joined the AKP. He received his PhD degree in 1983 from Istanbul University and became an associate professor of international economics in 1989. Among the founders of the AKP, he was the prime minister of Turkey in 2002 until Erdogan's return to politics in 2003. Gul was appointed deputy prime minister, then minister of foreign affairs between 2003 and 2007, and he became the president in 2007.

Military: Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish military embraced the role of guardian of the principles of the Republic. It conducted two 'hard coups' in 1960 and 1980, and three 'soft coups' in 1971, 1997 and 2007, which are known as military memorandums and e-memorandum, respectively. Since 1999, due to the reforms of the EU process, military-civilian relations have gone through a re-regulation phase and the military's involvement in politics has been reduced.

Opposition

CHP—Kemal Kilicdaroglu: Kemal Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP). The CHP is the oldest party in Turkey, which was established by Ataturk in 1923. It is a centre-left party and defines itself as the 'Party of the people' and the 'Party of change'. The CHP is the major opposition party in the Turkish Parliament, winning 25.9% of the votes in the June 2011 elections.

MHP—Devlet Bahceli: Devlet Bahceli is the leader of the National Movement Party (MHP), which was founded in 1969 and is a far-right party. The MHP is characterized by a combination of staunch nationalism and conservative values. It won 13.0% of the votes in the June 2011 elections, becoming the second largest opposition party in Parliament.

BDP—Selahattin Demirtas: Selahattin Demirtas is the leader of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). The BDP was founded in 2008 and is a nationalist Kurdish party. It received 6.5% of the votes in the June 2011 elections. It fielded the independent members of the Parliament in order to exceed the 10% national threshold.

Civil Society

TUSIAD: Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) was established in 1971 as a voluntary-based civil society organization by Turkish industrialists and businessmen. TUSIAD is the biggest and most powerful business organization in Turkey. Its members vary from owners and managers of individual firms to groups of companies operating in almost all major sectors of the Turkish economy. TUSIAD represents the big businesses to help Turkey achieve the standards of living and industrialization already attained by the developed western world.

MUSIAD: Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD) was established in 1990. Its stated aim is the social and economic development of the country by promoting production in industry, honesty and fairness in trade, high ethical and moral politics. It aims to find solutions to the problems of Turkey, Muslim countries in the region and mankind in general. Its members are conservative small- and medium-sized industries mostly located in Central and Eastern Anatolian cities.

TOBB: The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) was established in 1950. It leads and guides the Turkish entrepreneurs and submits opinions and comments in line with the requirements of the private sector. It is mainly representative of small- and medium-sized enterprises.

TUSKON: The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) was established in 2005. It aims to make the Turkish economy and businessmen an effective part of the global economy by considering local conditions and sensitivities.

Rahmi Koc: Rahmi Koc is a businessman. He is currently the honorary chairman of the Koc Holding, which is one of the largest industrial conglomerates of Turkey established in 1926.

Guler Sabanci: Guler Sabanci is a businesswoman. She is the chair of the Sabanci Holding, which is one of the largest industrial and financial conglomerates of Turkey established in 1966.

Memur-Sen: Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions (Memur-Sen) was established in 1995 by the civil servants. It aims to defend the rights and interests of workers and employers, improvement of social security and to ensure better working conditions.

Turk-Is: Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) was established in 1952. It is the oldest, largest and most strongly centralized confederation. It aims to solve the nation's workers' problems in co-operation with but independent from government.

Religious Orders

Suleymanci Order: The Suleymanci Order was founded by Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959). Since the 1950s, it has supported centre-right parties like many other religious orders. It has chapters in Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, France, Sweden and Switzerland.

Naksibendi Order: The Naksibendi Order was the most widespread order in the Ottoman empire. It was also at the root of political Islam in Turkey, in the sense that the Islamist parties and some of their members had Naksibendi backgrounds.

Gulen Movement: The Gulen Movement has its roots in the Nurcu Movement of Said Nursi (1873–1960). It is an alliance of schools, universities, financial institutions, labour unions, charities, newspapers and radio stations, with no formal organizational structure. The Movement has millions of followers including students, journalists, businessmen and professionals.

Appendix C: Data

Table C1. Issue 1: Preference over relationship between religion and the state

Stakeholder	Position	Influence	Group influence	Salience
PM Erdogan	40	100	100	98
FM Davutoglu	40	20	100	20
Speaker Parliament Cicek	40	40	100	50
President Gul	40	50	100	60
Military	60	100	50	90
CHP Kilicdaroglu	90	100	30	50
MHP Bahceli	80	50	30	50
BDP Demirtas	80	30	30	20
TUSIAD	100	100	20	40
MUSIAD	20	70	20	70
TOBB	75	75	20	40
TUSKON	30	50	20	70
Rahmi Koc	60	30	20	30
Guler Sabanci	80	30	20	30
Memur-Sen	30	30	20	40
Turk-Is	60	50	20	30
Suleymanci Order	40	20	50	70
Naksibendi Order	30	60	50	80
Gulen Movement	30	100	50	90
USA	80	100	80	50
EU	100	100	50	70
Russia	100	100	30	40
China	100	100	5	20
Iran	0	100	30	80
Israel	80	100	30	80
Other Middle East	20	100	20	80
Turkish Republics	100	100	10	40

Table C2. Issue 2: What Turkey should promote in the Middle East

Stakeholder	Position	Influence	Group influence	Salience
PM Erdogan	60	100	100	40
FM Davutoglu	60	20	100	60
Speaker Parliament Cicek	70	40	100	20
President Gul	60	50	100	40
Military	100	100	50	40
CHP Kilicdaroglu	100	100	30	50
MHP Bahceli	100	50	30	40
BDP Demirtas	100	30	30	20
TUSIAD	100	100	20	20
MUSIAD	60	70	20	40
TOBB	80	75	20	20
TUSKON	65	50	20	30
Rahmi Koc	100	30	20	20
Guler Sabanci	100	30	20	20

(Continued)

Table C2. *Continued*

Stakeholder	Position	Influence	Group influence	Salience
Memur-Sen	60	30	20	20
Turk-Is	80	50	20	10
Suleymanci Order	65	20	50	60
Naksibendi Order	60	60	50	60
Gulen Movement	60	100	50	60
USA	100	100	80	50
EU	100	100	50	50
Russia	80	100	30	40
China	40	100	5	20
Iran	60	100	30	90
Israel	40	100	30	70
Other Middle East	60	100	20	90
Turkish Republics	80	100	10	20

Table C3. Issue 3: Foreign policy preferences

Stakeholder	Position	Influence	Group influence	Salience
PM Erdogan	75	100	100	85
FM Davutoglu	60	20	100	90
Speaker Parliament Cicek	50	40	100	40
President Gul	75	50	100	60
Military	75	100	50	90
CHP Kilicdaroglu	100	100	30	75
MHP Bahceli	60	50	30	50
BDP Demirtas	85	30	30	30
TUSIAD	100	100	20	60
MUSIAD	50	70	20	50
TOBB	75	75	20	55
TUSKON	50	50	20	50
Rahmi Koc	100	30	20	60
Guler Sabanci	100	30	20	60
Memur-Sen	60	30	20	30
Turk-Is	60	50	20	20
Suleymanci Order	50	20	50	40
Naksibendi Order	50	60	50	50
Gulen Movement	80	100	50	60
USA	100	100	80	70
EU	100	100	50	60
Russia	50	100	30	60
China	50	100	5	30
Iran	0	100	30	90
Israel	100	100	30	95
Other Middle East	50	100	20	50
Turkish Republics	50	100	10	30

Table C4. Issue 4: Foreign economic policy

Stakeholder	Position	Influence	Group influence	Saliency
PM Erdogan	60	100	100	60
FM Davutoglu	60	20	100	60
Speaker Parliament Cicek	65	40	100	50
President Gul	60	50	100	65
Military	70	100	50	70
CHP Kilicdaroglu	100	100	30	50
MHP Bahceli	60	50	30	40
BDP Demirtas	100	30	30	20
TUSIAD	100	100	20	90
MUSIAD	50	70	20	90
TOBB	75	75	20	90
TUSKON	55	50	20	95
Rahmi Koc	100	30	20	95
Guler Sabanci	100	30	20	95
Memur-Sen	60	30	20	50
Turk-Is	75	50	20	50
Suleymanci Order	55	20	50	40
Naksibendi Order	50	60	50	45
Gulen Movement	65	100	50	80
USA	100	100	80	60
EU	100	100	50	75
Russia	50	100	30	60
China	45	100	5	40
Iran	0	100	30	75
Israel	100	100	30	80
Other Middle East	15	100	20	60
Turkish Republics	60	100	10	50