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**ENHANCING GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN MOROCCO:
A COUNTRY ASSESSMENT**

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Executive Summary: Providing Public Goods in the Transition from Autocracy

This overview explores the strategies employed by the monarchy of Morocco to ensure its welfare in the context of the Kingdom's changing economic and political circumstances since independence. Our analysis will attempt to explain the policies chosen by the monarchy to consolidate its power in each economic and political conjuncture since independence. Our analysis is divided into four stages; contraction of the winning coalition, crisis, expansion and finally institution building. It begins with an assessment of the institutional legacy of the government of Hassan II, the founder of the modern Moroccan state. Like any political leader Hassan II must propose public and private goods to supporters subject to a budget restraint. To ensure its own welfare, the monarchy must be able offer sufficient private and public goods to maintain the loyalty of regime supporters. In stage one, the strategy employed by the king is to contract the winning coalition in order to create a strong premium on loyalty. In stage two the King had to modify his strategy by enlarging the winning coalition in response to a financial crisis. But in order for that strategy to succeed, a range of new institutions are needed.

Contraction: The monarchy must always seriously consider the threat of revolution or a mass movement that appeal to the urban classes. In the first two decades after independence the strategy used by the monarchy to offset this threat was contracting the winning coalition thereby strengthening a handful of loyalist while reducing the public goods that might make it easier for

challengers to organize and coordinate opposition to the government. The focus on delivering private goods increased loyalty to the monarchy within the coalition. The key supporters were the military brass, an interlocking group of business elites that also managed state owned companies, religious elite, and large scale agriculturalists. As the military increased its relative standing within the coalition it was able to threaten the regime, making the monarchy's position more contestable. The religious elite gained control over public education. The result is an educational curriculum that does not support the skill-set the nation needs to increase its economic engagement with the global economy. The major industry, agriculture, was an additional key contributor to the coalition. Major investments were made by the state, often backed by international capital, in irrigated, large scale agriculture which provided another source of private goods for the monarchy to disburse. The agricultural ministry, which serves the non-irrigated producers, is paralyzed by inappropriate procedures, weak staffing and inadequate coordination, yet government services to the irrigated sector are of much higher quality, as will be discussed in our analysis of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Rising phosphate prices, international loans for major development infrastructure and the ability to nationalize the assets of French firms enabled the monarchy to strengthen loyalty without having to enact policies to stimulate broad-based economic activity. Since the government's budget was primarily focused on the provisioning of private goods, supporters feared being cut off. The monarchy emerged as the dominant political force within the country because it successfully reduced the capacity of potential challengers to provide alternatives. Throughout this period monarchy attempted to co-opt some of the poor with side payments such as subsidies for consumption of basic commodities. The problem with this overall strategy is that

contracting the base of supporters also shrank the country's economy, reducing the Monarch's access to resources.

Crisis: All of these alliances created vulnerabilities. Government was run as an all encompassing patronage system which did not generate sufficient resources to meet all the demands of an expanding increasingly-urbanized population. The collapse of phosphate prices, the increasing cost of energy and the expanding war in the Sahara depleted the monarchy's resource base. It faced massive desertions. The financial crisis was a critical moment when governance institutions were altered due to a shock that jeopardized all social groups including the King's inner circle. Like many countries, when raw material export prices -- phosphates in the Moroccan case -- collapsed in the mid-1970s Morocco turned to borrowing. Foreign debt soared \$10 billion by the end of the 1970s, trapping Morocco in the LDC debt crisis of the 1980s and resulting in three structural adjustment programs in 1983 with the IMF and World Bank. The system of law enforcement, economic regulation and service provision protected very few; it reduced the ability of the majority to engage in profitable economic activities. The monarchy embarked upon a trajectory to increase resources through economic growth. Tools had to be given to Moroccans outside the original winning coalition to increase their own welfare and expand the economic base that the crown could tax.

Expansion:

To recover from the crisis the monarchy had to face the challenge of increasing its income by growing the economy. It increased opportunity for political and economic mobility. It embarked on a program to modernize the administrative services to increase the capacity of government, originally designed to dole out patronage, to plan and carry out policy.

The leadership of Morocco understands that like other governments in the MENA region it faces a credible revolutionary threat. Since sufficient coordination opportunities exist it is easier to organize insurgent activities than in the past. But the monarchy is not prepared to offer any further public goods to co-opt potential supporters. By increasing public goods the crown has already increased the appeal of a revolutionary challenge, since exclusion from the inner circle matters less.

The problem the crown faces today is that some members of the opposition cannot be co-opted. Morocco has become a recruiting ground for jihad. The jihadists hold the westernized elites that preach western ideas like democracy responsible for the regime's governance failures and the social exclusion that has resulted. Their popular appeal is strong because the monarchy does not provide sufficient public resources to satisfy everyone. The Islamist critique has a solid foundation. Private goods and patronage, what the opposition call the 'politics of rent', is still the basis of gaining and holding on to power.

Institutional Change:

The monarchy's new strategy is to improve the quality of public goods to keep the citizens sufficiently satisfied to prevent them from joining the Islamist movement. Reforming the administrative apparatus to support these efforts of the monarchy will be the objective of our suggestions in Part Two.

There is a danger that ill-conceived aid can be used by the monarchy to restore its small coalition system. We recommend a pilot project in one sector in one region to overcome this danger by ensuring that the resources are used to sustain a larger coalition system and to ensure that the incumbent administrators sitting in Rabat cannot expropriate all of the benefits.

Our suggestions are guided by the belief that increasing the winning coalition in Morocco offers the best long-term prospects for promoting the welfare of the population. We seek to work with the government of Morocco to create institutions that will encourage leaders to choose policies that will contribute to the broadest possible welfare of the population.

ENHANCING GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN MOROCCO:

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A clam was sitting out in the sun when suddenly a snipe flew down to peck at the clam. Suddenly, the clam slammed the shell shut, gripping the snipe's beak in between. The snipe said, "If it doesn't rain today, and it doesn't rain tomorrow, I shall see a dead clam on the beach." The clam said, "If I don't open today, and I don't open up tomorrow, I shall see a dead snipe on the beach." While they were still grappling with each other, a fisherman passed by and netted them both.

The plot of a Chinese Film based on ancient proverb

INTRODUCTION: HASSAN II AND THE CREATION OF A NARRATIVE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Even outspoken critics of the Moroccan monarchy will agree with Aboubakr Jamaï that: "The process of democratization and modernization in general of the country can be achieved at lower cost with the monarchy than against it."¹ The emergence of the monarchy as the pivotal player in post-colonial Moroccan history is the work of the late King Hassan II. His instinct for institutional preservation has made the monarchy indispensable to Morocco's well-being. The policies he implemented to secure the monarchy's grip on power, counterbalancing local-agrarian against urban elites, has created a society in which the beliefs and norms underpinning

¹ Aboubakr Jamaï, "Discipliner la Monarchie" *le Journal*, Aug 7, 2008: 5-6.

the legitimacy of the state are so divergent that it is hard to imagine that constitutionalism can substitute entirely for the patrimonial role of the monarchy. The problem for the country's long-term development is that the monarchy has created its support by using private goods to build a narrow base of key supporters. The tactics it will have to employ to reverse this trend is to build a wider base by delivering public goods more broadly.

Known as a heavy-handed autocrat who tyrannized his subjects Hassan II nevertheless anticipated that the monarchy's ultimate survival would eventually require political liberalization. During the last years of his reign, he initiated a dialogue between the monarchy and its opposition. Only, by then, the opposition was so divided and weakened that it could no longer threaten the monarchy. Hassan's strategy of adaptive transformation is being followed by his son Mohammed VI.

Morocco is a country of profound contrasts. It could become ungovernable in the future if the aspirations of the urban elites and those of the rural masses continue to be separated by a huge gap. The strategies employed by Hassan II to assert the monarchy's dominant role over the nation's politics is both a cause and a consequence of those rifts. After Independence, the bourgeoisie tried to use the bureaucracy which it controlled to dominate the other sectors of society to undertake a process of modernization that would continue the liberalization begun under the protectorate and build the nation-state promised in the nationalist rhetoric of the liberation era (Leveau 1976). Hassan II was intent on undermining the urban bourgeoisie's control over the bureaucracy by strengthening the regime's ties to rural notables, steering the economy away from industrialization, and placing great emphasis on large scale irrigated agriculture (export oriented). His goal was to establish the monarchy as the intermediary between the peasantry and the national bureaucracy. Because of its urban roots, the bureaucracy

and the bourgeois elites were mistrusted by rural society allowing the monarchy to become the arbiter between a modernizing bourgeoisie and the rural world. Building strong ties to rural notables allowed Hassan II to obstruct plans for large-scale industrialization that may have put the country under the leadership of the bourgeoisie.

After independence, Morocco could easily have become a one party, anti-Western state, dominated by a nationalist party that advocated state-ism and Arab-ism. To prevent this outcome, the monarchy waged a battle for political supremacy that was above all ideological and cultural rather than economic. Economic development of the population, an entirely secondary objective of royal policies, was pursued only to prevent extreme poverty from becoming a political liability. Social and physical infrastructure for the masses was neglected; instead, the king allowed redistribution to distort prices to benefit consumers, a policy whose adverse fiscal consequences were to surface during the early 1980s.

At the same time, Hassan II aligned himself firmly with Western nations against global communism. As the chief proprietor and economic actor in the realm, the monarchy had no difficulty seeing the urban-based socialist opposition as a primary threat. That partnership against international socialism gave the regime access to international institutions and technology it needed to preserve itself. It opened the country to loans from Western banks and donors as well.

Despite the infusion of development loans and grants, Morocco struggled to rid itself of widespread poverty. The roots of continuing poverty in Morocco can be traced to the lack of agrarian reform after independence and to King Hassan's agricultural policies. Agrarian reform was no sooner started than it was abandoned. By 1962, only 22 % of the lands were distributed (see Pascon and Bouderbala quoted below). The concentration of investments in modern, export-

oriented farming (publicly backed by King Hassan) and the neglect of traditional agriculture -- from which 90 percent of Moroccan peasants still derive their income -- led to a massive exodus from rural areas, a dramatic expansion of urban shantytowns, and an increasing dependence on imported grain. Nevertheless, these policies were in line with mainstream development economics of the day.

Another legacy of Hassan II is an apparatus of control that penetrates every aspect of social organization tightly managed from Rabat. At the beginning of his reign the king fused the Ministry of the Interior with the landlords creating a network of control and patronage in every township and village of the kingdom from which the primary beneficiaries were the local notables.

Difficulty in oversight and participation resulted. Elites have administrators' privileges that give them advantages over citizens; they enjoyed a history of refusing to cooperate with the monarchy while facing a state apparatus that has been weakened by this refusal. The monarchy did not want to create an environment in which its wishes could be constrained by the civil service. An independent civil service bound by rules and recruited by merit were not what the Monarch wanted but it left the Monarch with weak tools to implement policy either. The result is a state whose agencies for justice, rule enforcement and revenue collection are weak, in which elites have immunity from taxation and law-enforcement and can sanction the ruler through non-cooperation. But with immunity they must accept a state that is powerless to enforce laws or policies effectively and most notably that cannot collect revenues or uphold justice. A culture of administrative impunity results from this situation leaving the population vulnerable to transgressions both by the monarchy by the administration and by wealthy elites. Although citizens are deeply apprehensive about the integrity of government, and that of politicians,

citizens lack the tools to coordinate and check administrative abuse. This has caused political apathy among the many and extremism among a few.

Hassan II left his successor a society marred by deep fractures caused by deficits of productive resources, revenue, information, credit, capital, financial security and the right to participate politically. With few reliable institutions, trust diminished to support the government. In 2001, the World Values Survey reported that over 76% of Moroccans had no trust in other people, or, put differently, only 24% felt that other people could be trusted (Figures 1 & 2).

Figure 1

Question- Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?





Figure 2

Question- Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?



Source: World Value Survey (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>)

To understand more fully the origins of today's institutional gaps, it is important to look more closely at the history of the country, as discussed below.

DIVIDE AND RULE

From 1956 to 1975, the monarchy confronted a range of different actors, including political parties, the army, students, unions, intellectuals and journalists. The main actors in these confrontations were the monarchy, represented by the traditional institution of the *Makhzen*², with Hassan II as the architect of its post-independence revival, versus the parties of the Nationalist Movement, namely the Istiqlal and the Union National des Forces Populaires (UNFP)³. At stake in the tug-of-war between Hassan II and the Nationalist Movement was the kind of regime Morocco should adopt -- especially in a context where socialism, nationalization,

² The historically important central government in which the King plays a pivotal role, aided by a complex network of groups of courtiers, religious scholars, notables, local feudal lords and saintly figures and relying on ad hoc or more durable alliances with tribes and groups at the local level, with Caids, governors, judges, and Marabouts (local saints) playing an important role in ensuring stability, allegiance to the King and a more or less successful management of local affairs. See William Zartman, *Destiny of a Dynasty: The Search for Institutions in Morocco's Developing Society*, Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1964.

³ The UNFP seceded from the Istiqlal in 1959 and became in 1975 the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP).

post-colonial rhetoric, one-party systems and liberation agendas were highly popular among Third World elites. While Hassan II strove to create an executive monarchy that rules and governs, it evolved into an absolute and autocratic regime in the late sixties and early seventies.⁴ The Nationalist Movement parties, or the Opposition as they came to be called since the late sixties, wanted to limit the King's power to that of a figurehead, institute a one-party system⁵ and irreversibly arabize and islamicize the country.⁶

The struggle took on different forms and evolved as the different actors became entrenched in their positions. Riots were common in the sixties, seventies and eighties and were used by the Opposition to mobilize schools, universities, factories and whole cities (as in 1965, 1981, 1984 and 1990) against the regime either for bargaining purposes (especially after the Opposition tacitly conceded defeat by the mid-seventies) or in reaction to unpopular decisions that the King felt he could not avoid. The King resorted to repression, arrests, curfews and rule by royal decree⁷, followed by brief interludes of openness, freedom of expression and tolerance of dissenting voices. "Divide and Rule" was the tactic Hassan II used since the late fifties: he encouraged the creation of the UNFP out of the left-wing elements of the Istiqlal (1959), helped engineer the secession within the Mouvement Populaire (both in 1967 and 1986), caused the splitting of the Rassemblement des Indépendistes into two parties in the early eighties, and masterminded the introduction of Islamist organizations into the universities in the late seventies and early eighties to counter the highly popular Marxist Union Nationale *de Etudiants*

⁴ See Abdallah Hammoudi, *Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism*. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997).

⁵ At least for the Istiqlal Party which has always believed that it is the liberator of Morocco from colonial rule and the initiator of the Revolution of the King and the People (1953-1956). See Allal Al-Fasi, *Al Harakat al-Istiqlaliya fi al Maghribi al 'Arabi* (Independence Movements in the Arab Maghreb) (Marrakech, 1956).

⁶ The latter is more true of the Istiqlal Party than it is of the UNFP/USFP.

⁷ The longest period of what is called "exceptional rule" has been between 1965 and 1971, in which Morocco had no parliament and state affairs were carried out by royal and ministerial decrees.

Marocains, etc. Segmentation of society and politics allowed the monarchy to balance the competition between genuine and manufactured forces, making the monarchy indispensable as arbiter in the eyes of both the populace and the elite.⁸

At the beginning, the balance seemed to favor the Nationalist Movement. The Istiqlal mobilized public opinion in favor of Mohamed V (1927-1961) giving the King a credit for being part of the national liberation movement. Sociologically, the supporters of the Istiqlal Party were urban bourgeoisie, lower middle class elements, civil servants, traders and craftsmen as well as students, teachers and intellectuals. As such, they seemed to control the cities and therefore, public opinion in general. At first they were bold enough to ban the Communist Party (1959), repress the Shura and Istiqlal Party into non-existence (1956-1959), and oppose the Army of Liberation. As crown prince, Hassan II tried to convince his father Mohamed V to curb the ambitions of the Istiqlal, but he was only mildly successful. Istiqlal's popularity was due in part to the support of figures like Allal Al Fassi and Mehdi Ben Barka,⁹ whom Mohamed V himself respected.

However, even as crown prince in the late fifties, Hassan II saw that to end Istiqlal's grip on the political scene he needed the support of the security forces. First, he encouraged the reintegration of the officers that had worked for the colonial armies into the burgeoning Royal Armed Forces. The colonial armies' officers would later prove instrumental in repressing the Opposition-led riots in the sixties (especially the notorious general Mohamed Oufkir),¹⁰ although the same officers would turn against Hassan II in two bloody coup d'états on July 10, 1971 and

⁸ See J. Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Elite: A Study of Segmented Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1982).

⁹ See René Gallissot and Jacques Kergoat, *Mehdi Ben Barka : De L'indépendance marocaine à la Tricontinentale* (Karthala, 2000) ; Zakya Daoud and Maâti Monjib, *Ben Barka* (Michalon, 1996) ; « Mohammed Allal Al Fassi » in *Encyclopedia Universalis*.

¹⁰ See Stephen Smith, *Oufkir : un destin marocain* (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 2002.)

August 14, 1972.¹¹ He also obtained a pardon for a good part of the Caid and local lords who had sided with the French against Mohamed V. Hassan II understood the capacity of the latter to mobilize the local population, especially in the rural areas, despite their repressive past in favor of the colonizer. Second, he encouraged the creation of the Mouvement Populaire (1958), which assembled under its umbrella elements of the Liberation Army, Berbers not happy with the Istiqlal's Arabist designs and local notables at odds with the urban elite and bourgeoisie. Last but not least, he helped engineer the split within the Istiqlal and the subsequent birth of the UNFP. The latter was given the leadership of the government (albeit for a short time) to boost its capacity to counter nationalist hardliners. The nationalists were still popular in urban centers and among the educated middle classes but they were deprived of the political and legal tools to institutionalize their grip on the political scene.

Pluralism is one of the many tactics Hassan II employed to curb the Istiqlal's ambitions.¹² In 1958, he championed a decree that established the legal framework for the creation of non-governmental organizations, including political parties, as well as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech,¹³ ending the Istiqlal's capacity to brand itself as the only legitimate party. The legislation created new political openings: new parties or alliances to counter Istiqlal arose, including the Mouvement Populaire (1958), the UNFP (1959) and the Front de Défense de Institutions Constitutionnelles (FDIC in 1963), etc.

Hassan II opened up political space for new groups because he did not want to drive his opponents underground; yet, he genuinely believed that a constrained political sphere is necessary to keep the actors contesting and competing with each other and prevent one group

¹¹ See André Pautard et Madeleine Axelrad « 1972 : La seconde tentative de coup d'Etat » *L'Express* (March 16, 2006).

¹² See Mark Tessler, « Morocco : Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical Dominance » in I. William Zartman, ed. *Political Elites in the Arab North Africa*, New York: Longman, 1982): 35-91.

¹³ See dahir n° 1-59-245 of 2 November 1959 in the *Bulletin Officiel*.

from monopolizing either the support of, or the opposition to, the regime.¹⁴ Socialists were nominated to the government, reconciliation started and public hearings on human rights began.

Hassan II created a regime of notables tied to the monarchy by webs of dependency and reciprocity that he could monitor through the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. The rural areas and traditional elites created a wide alliance against the nationalists' urban network of support. Caids, notables, religious scholars, Berber generals and elites, Sufi and other brotherhood members and representatives, in addition to both landed and small farmers, all joined the alliance in the sixties helping Hassan II to consolidate his grip on power. The Caids included both traditional local lords and newly appointed Ministry of Interior representatives. While the latter were instrumental in mobilizing the rural population in favor of the monarchy, the former were well established crypto-feudal lords with enough resources, prestige and power to influence an uneducated and historically subjugated peasantry.¹⁵ The notables were generally landed farmers, some absentee landowners, whose interests clashed with the agrarian reform slogans of the Left as well as with the nationalist agenda of "the land belongs to those who cultivate it." By putting a halt to the agrarian reform in the early sixties, Hassan II catered to their needs but recruited them to play a pivotal role in the alliance. They ran local governments and assemblies along with professional organizations.

Another group that Hassan II mobilized for the traditionalist alliance was the Marabouts. As arbitrators between feuding clans or tribes over grazing, access to water, land ownership or acts of theft, the Marabouts acted as intermediaries between the central government and the

¹⁴ See Abdellah Laroui, *Le Maroc et Hassan II: Un Témoignage* (Paris : Presses Interuniversitaires, 2005)

¹⁵ For the Caidal system see Paul Pascon, *Le Haouz de Marrakech* (1983) and Lahcen Haddad, *Le Résiduel et l'émergent : Le devenir des structures sociales traditionnelles* (Rabat : Publications de la Faculté des Lettres, 2000).

dissident tribes.¹⁶ They set up brotherhoods and pilgrimage centers that the general population follows for *baraka* (spiritual blessing) or which provide their supernatural intervention with God, in exchange for offerings, trance festivities and vassal-master relationships. The Marabouts were opposed to the purist proto-Wahabi agenda of the Salafi wing of the Istiqlal party, represented by Allal Al Fassi, Ahmed Bensouda and Mohamed Belarbi El Alaoui, and which considered the Sufi brotherhoods crypto-heretical groups who engaged in pagan practices and un-Islamic beliefs. The Istiqlal and its secular offshoot, the UNFP, threatened not only the web of relations, allegiances, loyalties and networks of the Maraboutic system but its economic interests as well. Hassan II protected the brotherhoods, encouraging them and funding their festivals, and helping them develop new ones.

Religious scholars also found shelter with the king. Although some were affiliated with the Nationalist Movement through its Salafist branch, they were adamantly against any tutelage of the post-independence governments over their autonomy. Religious scholars' bastions were the traditional religious system of education, the traditional courts, the religious councils and of course the Waqf system (real estate pledged by individuals and families for religious purposes and causes). When the Ministry of Education tried to impose its tutelage on the religious education system in 1960, religious scholars organized a showdown that ended with them regaining their autonomy despite Mohamed V's intervention.¹⁷ Hassan II retired the religious

¹⁶ From Arabic « Mrabet », the Marabout is the French word for the leaders of Sufi and other Saintly brotherhoods that became powerful with the rise of Sharifi (descendent form the Prophet) dynasties since the 16th century. See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969), Dale Eickelmann, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), Paul Rabinow, *Symbolic Domination: Cultural Form and Historical Change in Morocco* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975), Jacques Berque, *Ulémas, fondateurs, insurgés du Maghreb* (Paris: Sinbad, 1982), Nikki Keddie, *Schools, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), and Lahcen Haddad, *Le résiduel et l'émergent* cited above.

¹⁷ See Mohamed Tozy, « Islam and the State » in *Policy and Society in Contemporary North Africa* eds. I. William Zartman and William Mark Habeeb (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). See also Lahcen Haddad, "The University:

scholars that were openly affiliated with the Opposition, co-opted others, and “nationalized” the rest by making them directly dependent on the government.

All of the above cited groups were instrumental in providing a strong traditionalist bulwark against the National Movement’s right- and left-wing parties; nonetheless these pro-King traditional groups remain by and large elitist. Hassan II needed a popular base as well to counter the urban support for the nationalists. He looked for that support among the peasantry and the rural population, as both Arab and Berber. Peasants had always been loyal to Moroccan dynasties.¹⁸ However the struggle for Independence made the bond between the peasantry and the monarchy almost sacred. The nationalists mobilized the population in favor of independence by sacralizing the exiled Mohamed V.¹⁹ After independence, this came back to haunt them because the population, especially the peasantry, had already accepted the Alawite kings (Mohamed V and his successor Hassan II) as immaculately untainted Marabouts.²⁰ Hassan II used the elaborate network of the Ministry of Interior to further mobilize the peasantry on his side and parties like the Mouvement Populaire to mobilize the Berbers; at the same time, he put a systematic ban on the Nationalist parties’ action in the countryside.

By manufacturing this wide traditionalist alliance, Hassan II achieved four objectives: creating a bulwark against the modernizing tendency of the left and of the urban bourgeoisie; reinforcing traditional Islam against the Salafism of the conservative wing of the nationalists; boosting his power base, especially in the rural areas (which constituted 70 % of the population

An Archeology of Paradoxes, Crises, Agents, Functions, and Histories” in *The Idea of the University* ed. Taieb Belghazi (Rabat: Publications of the Faculty of Letters, 2000): 311-333.

¹⁸ Remy Leveau, *Le Fellah marocain, défenseur du Trône* (Paris : Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976).

¹⁹ Legends were circulated whereby Mohamed V appeared on the face of the Moon or that the French wanted to kill him by putting him on an exile plane with little fuel but he managed to fill the tank by simply putting his rosary bead on the engine etc.

²⁰ See Elaine Combs-Schilling, *Sacred Performances : Islam, Sexuality and Sacrifice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) for an anthropologico-historical account of this phenomenon.

in the sixties); and preparing an elite that would govern with him should the nationalists continue to refuse to cooperate on his own conditions. Nonetheless, ideologically, nationalism, socialism as well as modernization were in vogue. Hassan II looked as if he were swimming against the tide by favoring traditional forces. Moreover, the grand-scale alliance needed huge resources to keep together. The members of the coalition needed to feel that their interests were served, so that they would not only stay loyal but defend the regime as well.

Hassan II's answer to the ideological challenge of the nationalists was an attempt to retraditionalize society and the Makhzen. He cited age-old rules and powers -- sacred tradition -- to legitimize his authority, recreating the traditional rituals that were developed by the Saadi Sultans in the 16th and 17th centuries and surrounding himself with a sacred aura in line with his claim to be of sharfi descent.²¹ The traditional bay'a (allegiance) became highly ceremonialized and ritualized and a very acute sense of lèse majesté was established. Hassan II's model was France's Sun King Louis XIV, embedded in the ritualistic paraphernalia of the Saadi Makhzen.²² Hassan II set up a whole sub-culture of behavior, ritual, codes and signs, relayed by scores of courtiers, servants, protocol designers, and palace managers that the lay population looked up to and identified with.²³ Makhzen life and culture was a hermetically sealed sacred space, having at its center the King surrounded by an aura of awe and sanctity for Moroccans to identify with and admire.

The retraditionalization had two social aspects: one, reproducing the symbolic and cultural elements of the past; two, recasting traditional religious education while resisting the generalization and the unification of the educational system desired by the nationalists. On the

²¹ For a detailed description of this process and its impact see Combs-Schilling, *Sacred Performances*.

²² See Al Ifrani, Muhammad al-Sagir ibn Muhammad, *Nozhat al Hedi: Histoire de la dynastie saadienne au Maroc (1511-1670)*. (1700s) . Translated from Arabic into French by O. Houda. (Paris : Leroux, 1889).

²³ See Mohamed Tozy, « Monopolisation de la production symbolique et hiérarchisation du champ politico-religieux au Maroc, » in *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 18 (1979) : 219-234.

first level, retraditionalization took the form of a systematic revival of traditional *moussems* (religious festivals around specific saints), traditional forms of tribal management, traditional institutions like the elders' councils (*jemaa*),²⁴ and local forms of jurisprudence. This traditional mode of governance and political culture ran in parallel with the modern systems ushered in by post-independence governments. The reinvented tradition was not supposed to supplant the modern system but to run parallel to it, as both a buffer and a source of balance; it catered to the needs of those disenchanted or alienated by the modernizing or the nationalist discourses of the Left and Istiqlal.

On the second level, Hassan II saw in the triumph of the Qarwiyyin²⁵ scholars over the Ministry of National Education an opportunity to win their favors by encouraging traditional education, providing support to the madrasas and finding forums for the scholars to shine, like the famous televised religious Hassani Lectures, preside by the King every Ramadan since the seventies. Again, the religious system of education was in no way a substitute for the modern system initiated by the French and consolidated by the post-Independence governments; it was a parallel system that graduates religious clerks, teachers, writers and scribes, all of which proved necessary and useful human resources for the reinvented tradition of religious life and institutions.

Hassan II needed huge resources to fund a state that was not predicated on bureaucratic modernization but on patronage to support a broad alliance. The alliance included rural notables,

²⁴ See C. Martel, *La jmaa administrative: étape dans l'évolution économique, politique et sociale des tribus berbères du Haut Atlas*, (Rabat, 1954).

²⁵ One of the oldest universities in the world, the Qarwiyyine was built in Fez in the eighth century and played an important role since then in higher education as well as in the production of knowledge. See G. Delfin, *Fès, son université et l'enseignement supérieur musulman* (Paris, 1889); Michaux-Bellaire « L'enseignement indigène au Maroc », *Revue du Monde Musulman*, Vol. XV (October, 1911) : 422-452 ; A. Périe, « Les Madarsas de Fas », *Archives marocaines*, Vol. XVIII, 1912 : 257-372 ; P. Grymoult, 'L'Université de Fès et les intellectuels marocains », *Mercure de France*, 15 Juin, 1920 ; L. Brunot, « L'Université marocaine de Karaouiyine », *Bulletin de l'Enseignement public au Maroc*, Vol. VIII, n° 32, Juin 1921 ; J. Berque, « Villes et universités : Aperçu sur l'histoire de l'Ecole de Fès », *Revue Historique et de Droit Français et Etranger* (Paris : 1949), pp. 64-117.

urban liberal forces, army officers and rank and file, religious scholars and remnants of both the Caidal and the Maraboutic orders. Rémy Leveau (1976) explains that to consolidate his power, Hassan II focused on creating private goods to sustain the personal network that began at the local level and that eluded formal constraints. Leveau writes:

“The control of the political system at its essence functioned thanks to a system of personal relationships dependent as much on family ties as on services rendered. The local elites extend the system of clientele to political parties and the bureaucracy. In order to satisfy their political mandates, they became the clients of one political figure or another, or one bureaucratic figure or another without ever engaging in ideology and without ever contracting formal links or ties. Political action just became a local or national extension of multiple social and economic ties of which the scaffolding of the entire structure was constructed... These relations emptied of all ideological or partisan content made impossible all political mobilization that was necessary for modernization” (Leveau 1976, 242).

Mistrustful of any social activity he could not control the King neglected to build rural infrastructure, limiting rural access to roads, irrigation, information and schools. Agrarian reform, especially the redistribution of lands to peasants, was halted at its very beginning so it would not divert valuable resources from the anti-nationalist coalition.²⁶ As Leveau explains: “The political system was designed to solve multiple private affairs with private goods and privileged access; the needs of the long term were ignored and began to manifest themselves with force under the pressure of democracy, the expansion of education, the opening to the external world and the growth of cities” (Leveau 1976, 242).

The system that Hassan II created is one in which authority is personal and familial, modeled upon the mechanics of a household. Political administration was conducted in a

²⁶ See Chraïbi Bouderbala et Paul Pascon, *La question agraire au Maroc*, (Rabat: BESM, 1974).

patrimonial style that contrast with the concept of rational bureaucracy governed by formal rules, where actors are selected according to competence and governed by administrative hierarchies to ensure that the private and the official are clearly separated. Keeping this background in mind is essential to appreciate the importance of the modernization program being proposed in Section Two. Mohammad VI started a process to fundamentally restructure and redirect the system of administration that Hassan II created.

A hierarchical clientelist system was put in place by Hassan II whereby members of the coalition would apply for perks, monopoly advantages, unearned incomes, concessions, and easy employment situations. Huge resources were also needed to fund the retraditionalization effort, the parallel religious education system, and the elaborate reinvention of Makhzen etiquette and lifestyle. Direct gifts to generals, notables, courtiers and local lords in the form of farms, factories and other real estate property were also necessary to keep the most important members of the coalition loyal and content.

Co-opting the support of religious elites by giving them great influence over schools made education a battle ground for an ideological and financial confrontation between Hassan II and the Nationalists.²⁷ Post-independence governments set up four pillars for educational development in Morocco: unification, Moroccanization, generalization and arabization.²⁸

²⁷ The 50 Year Report on Human Development summarized the situation as follows: “The hesitations [regarding educational reform] were also the result of a passionate, even exaggerated, political and social fixation around “School”. “School” has been a field of ideological and political polarization as well as a locus of political conflict and social and syndicated tensions. The direct result was that indecision has always marked educational reform. Colloquia were organized, commissions were formed and a plethora of recommendations were made without giving up on a prudent and tenacious hesitation, motivated by considerations other than genuine educational reform. In fact, these were essentially related to the political situation and the attitude of the State [read Hassan II] to some options (like free tuition, arabization, curricula etc.) which, despite the apparent consensus around them, were implicitly considered adventurous or having a negative impact on society as a whole [this is coded sentence for huge financial implications; note the French wording “ porteuses de lourdes conséquences sur l’ensemble de la société”].” Lahcen Haddad’s translation. *50 ans de développement humain & Perspectives 2025, Rapport Général, Chapitre III*, p. 12. www.rdh50.ma

²⁸ *50 ans de développement humain & Perspectives 2025, Rapport Général, Chapitre III*, p. 12. www.rdh50.ma

Unification and arabization were more costly for Hassan II from an ideological point of view. Unification means having the traditional system of qura'nic schools, medersas and theological faculties under the guidance of the Ministry of Education. Instead of the unified system that the Nationalists wanted, Hassan II created parallel modern/traditional tracks, private French mission schools that attracted the sons and daughters of the elite to diversity the system. A unified system would eliminate the power of the Makhzen to select and control the fortunes of the graduates, who might end up serving the Nationalist agenda over that of the King. A consequence is a population that is far removed from the skills and perspectives of the global marketplace which Morocco is trying to join. (For an in-depth analysis of the state of education in Morocco, please see the companion EGE assessment of the Ministry of Education.)

Arabization of curricula seemed at the time to serve the interests of Hassan II's retraditionalization agenda but in the end ran against it: when Nasserite pan-Arabism was attractive to the elite and the masses all over the Arab World, arabization meant serving the interests of the Nationalists by integrating Morocco deeply into Arab political culture. While Hassan II paid lip service to pan-Arab politics, he remained skeptical of the Nasser's and Baath parties' ulterior motives. In addition, the comprehensive arabization process would endanger the French-educated liberals who remained unattracted to the Arabist rhetoric of the nationalists and the Berbers, as represented by the Mouvement Populaire and later by Amazighi cultural organizations. The Berbers saw in arabization a direct assault on the millennial heritage of the Berbers and Morocco in general.

A young population with a fertility rate in the 50s and 60s (despite a high mortality rate and a moderate life expectancy)²⁹ implied a high percentage of school-age children. Responding to all of those needs and across all the cycles would imply financial efforts beyond what could be supported at a time when Hassan II was consolidating his grip on power, building an elaborate state and security apparatus, developing the capacity of the Army, and funding the large rural/notable/maraboutic coalition along with the retraditionalization effort. In fact, the period of high demand on education during the sixties and the seventies was met with a hesitant, wavering and unclear approach on the part of the State and Hassan II. Education was not a priority in Hassan II's agenda. The struggle for power against an urban and educated elite deeply engrossed in the rhetoric of nationalism, pan-Arabism and socialism topped the King's agenda.

A case in point was a 1965 Ministerial decision concerning access to high school for students aged 17 and above in Casablanca.³⁰ The objective was to reduce the number of students acceding to high school and the University to cut costs, instead redirecting them towards vocational centers. Students took to the streets, followed by parents and then the general population. The repression was unrelenting: General Oufkir used a helicopter to coordinate the security forces' intervention, leaving untold numbers of dead, and the country shocked.³¹ This was the first popular riot in a series of bloody confrontations between the State and the opposition forces from 1965 to 1990 and was fought over education.

²⁹ This of course has significantly changed over the last thirty years. See *50 ans de développement humain & Perspectives 2025, Rapport Général, Chapitre I*. www.rdh50.ma

³⁰ Vocational education then was not as valued as it is nowadays and it was mostly designed to give another chance to those who fail in the formal system.

³¹ Abdeslam Kadiri "Histoire. Casablanca, le 23 mars 1965." *Tel Quel* (March : 2005)

In the seventies, the political situation changed: Hassan II engineered the Green March (1975)³² to take the Sahara from the Spanish, boosting his popularity even among the educated middle classes; the Army, which had staged two unsuccessful coups against Hassan II in 1971 and 1972, was stationed in the south to fight a guerrilla war against the Algeria-supported Polisario; the Left (as represented by the UNFP) abandoned the revolutionary rhetoric and decided to participate in the 1975 elections. The Nationalists (as represented by the Istiqlal) had been so weakened that they decided to take part in the government of 1977. However, the University became a hotbed for extreme left radicals of all kinds, who were not only opposed to the King, but to the Nationalists and more or less to the Socialists as well. The radicalization of the University was dangerous not only because the King and the Istiqlal felt that the graduates would not serve their interests but also because down the road, civil servants and teachers would all come from the radical left. A radicalization of future generations would jeopardize the very existence of the monarchy and the Istiqlal.

Hassan II and the Istiqlal decided to initiate a sweeping Islamicization of the curricula both at the University and at the primary and secondary levels.³³ The Istiqlali Azzeddine Iraqui, who was first Minister of Education and then Prime Minister, oversaw the whole process with the approval of Hassan II. At the University level, a ban was put on philosophy departments (considered to be the source of radical ideas) while a dozen Islamic Studies departments were created and teachers were sent to Saudi Arabia and other countries to be trained in Islamic jurisprudence, theology, Prophetic Tradition and “sciences.” Despite limits on spending imposed by the Structural Readjustment Program (1983-1990), the State provided lavish resources to fund

³² Neijma Hamdaoui, "Hassan II lance la Marche verte », *Jeune Afrique*, (November 2, 2003).

³³ For a detailed account of this see Lahcen Haddad, “The University”, cited above; pp.326-328.

the operation, with the help of Saudi Arabia.³⁴ At the primary and secondary levels, Islamic education -- based on rote learning of Qur'an and Prophetic sayings -- became mandatory and was given a higher coefficient in grading not far from that of mathematics, Arabic and French. On the other hand, philosophy was marginalized and its coefficient reduced. By the mid-eighties, the Islamic Studies departments were already graduating bachelor degree holders who would serve as teachers of the newly important Islamic education in primary and secondary schools, as well as of Arabic and social studies. By the late eighties, the circle had become "virtuous": all students were taught in one way or another by Islamic Studies graduates and were surrounded by the fundamentalist rhetoric of Wahabi Islam. Hassan II and the Istiqlal were right: the Islamicization of the educational system ended the extreme Left's control of the University; but they were wrong about one major thing: the new "islamicized" students were anything but docile servants of Makhzenian ideology or Nationalist Salafism. As in other countries (Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Afghanistan), encouraging the rise of Islamism as a bulwark against the Left came back to haunt the State and the political parties in the wake of 9/11. The Al Qaida terrorist agenda found fertile ground among youth who had been denied access to social science programs and secular thought.

To summarize, although education has always been high on the agenda of the population, it was a victim of the ideological and budgetary wars between Hassan II and the Nationalists. Hassan II's approach to state and society was based on a segmented view of society designed to balance competing groups and forces. The goal was to manufacture traditional forces to counterbalance the modernizing of the nationalists; the latter, on the other hand, conceived of

³⁴ Engineering schools like the famous Ecole Mohammedia des Ingénieurs was imposed a military system in 1981 to make it difficult for students to engage in radical politics. A new police, called the University Guard, was formed and introduced on campuses in 1982 to control and curb the actions of radical groups associated with the Union National des Etudiants Marocains (UNEM).

reform from a post-colonial pan-Arabist perspective immersed in an ideology of nationalization, cultural homogenization and one-party uniformity. The result was that reform was never implemented in a serious manner, the system remained elitist and achieving broad-based enrollment in the education system was put on the backburner. In the seventies, the right-wing nationalists and Hassan II joined forces to Islamicize the curricula in order to put an end to the Leftist control of the University. Theology, rote learning and a Wahabi form of fundamentalism carried the day. The Islamicization of the system was successful but the victim was the quality education needed to modernize and train a workforce necessary to support a growing private sector. Islamicization, among other factors, tilted future educated generations towards religious conservatism but it did not make them less opposed to the King or the Nationalists, as it provided them with the codes and cultures to be conversant with universal militant and Jihadi Islam. Up until the late nineties, educational reform was hostage to considerations other than pedagogy or to the organizational capacity to deliver effective skills; and even after the consensual adoption of the Charter of Education,³⁵ the successive left-wing ministers carried out the implementation with an eye on the partisan political gains they could reap. That is why nine years after the adoption of the Charter, progress with educational reform, if any, is timid and continues to serve the interests of politicians.

The Military

The King's need for a strong military to consolidate his own grip on power opened his regime to the risk of a military coup, thereby creating a double-edged political/moral hazard. Not merely content to act as an agent of the king, the military turned against the monarchy on several occasions. One way of diffusing the threat of greater military involvement in domestic

³⁵ « Charte nationale d'éducation et de formation » 1999, <http://www.tlfg.ulaval.ca/axl/afrique/maroc-charte-educ.htm>.

politics was to expand the national defense role of the military by engaging it in the defense of the national honor in the Sahara.

To diffuse the threat of an emergent military dictatorship, the monarchy made increasing wage and policy concessions to the higher brass in the military. This has created a new danger: a growing rift within the military between the high brass and the lower ranking officers. As the army was co-opted by lavish payoffs, a new internal threat appeared in the form of infiltration by the Islamists. The extreme contrasts in the remuneration of the army chiefs and the rank-and-file officers have nurtured a deep resentment within the services which has taken the form of sympathy for Islamists within the military.

Given the task of repressing opposition, whether leftists, nationalists or other political enemies (and subsequently Islamists and supporters of Western Saharan independence), the military and security apparatus grew to become a potential threat to the monarchy itself. The military brass turned on King Hassan II in successive coups (1971, 1972) and then in an assassination attempt in 1983. A weakened Hassan II had to reach ever more deeply into his pockets to forestall another coup by buying the loyalty of the generals as the premium for their support continued to escalate, weakening the kingdom's economic foundation. The king needed increasingly larger supplies of royal largesse to recover from periods of instability. Land tenure policies designed to reinforce rural elites also benefited the military: "[T]he major beneficiaries of land distributions between 1971 and 1975 (after the 1971 and 1972 military coups) were high-ranking army officers" (Maghraoui 2001, 78).

Most of the benefits received by the military, including its budget, are secret and not subject to public review; it is alleged to possess substantial economic holdings and to be involved in illicit activities; the navy in particular has interests in the highly lucrative fishing

industry and reported ties to various types of smuggling into Europe. Thus the military is fully implicated in the regime's elitism and corruption, two grievances that play into the hands of the Islamic opposition.

THE ECONOMIC GENESIS OF A LIMITED ACCESS REGIME

Hassan II's economic policies were less original, and less successful than his success at playing identity politics. His brilliant political strategies designed to make the Monarch essential to the Moroccan identity ended up bankrupting his regime.

The economic program was subordinated to the need to create political order by closely identifying the state with elites' rights and privileges. Hassan II used administrative control to preserve opportunities within the domestic economy for members of his coalition. Resources, economic privileges and positions of authority within the state were allocated with the goal of creating a core of loyalists. Groups that were willing to align their interests with the Monarch had their property rights protected and their risks insured by the regime, but institutions whose role would be to protect the economic ambitions or plans of the citizenry were not established. Numerous market distortions in distribution and production resulted which invited unproductive investments in rent seeking.

Moroccanization of foreign assets during the early 1970s allowed Hassan II to create "state companies" that would be turned over to the business elite. According to Maghraoui:

"Through the creation of state companies in the country's more profitable industries (such as irrigated agriculture, food processing, tourism, banking, construction, and manufacturing), the monarchy used the public sector to control and reward prominent domestic allies. Typically the state bought out failing companies and resold them at nominal prices to the

king's associates once they became profitable – that is, once the public treasury paid for new infrastructure and the public sector ensured advantageous contracts” (Maghraoui 2002).

An import-substitution strategy guaranteed protected markets for most of these same companies. “By adopting further policies to promote local capital such as import licensing requirements, overvaluation of the local currency and increased import duties” (Cammett 2007, 1899), the monarchy hoped to ensure the success and dependency of client business elites. As Cammett explains:

“Moroccanization and the new trade regime reinforced, if not created, a powerful group of private capital holders with vast stakes in the local market. Members of these prominent families, many of which came from the city of Fes and were known as Fassis, consolidated their influence by obtaining key positions in the administration, national banks, parastatal organizations, and producer organizations” (Cammett 2007, 1899). Intervention and control along with repression of “the working class movement, trade unionism and the leftist political parties.” (Sater 2002, 15) gave Hassan II the means to create a dependant business class.

This traditional business elite organized itself through the main business association, the CGEM (Confederation Generales des Entreprises Marocaines), which excluded smaller enterprises. Business and government officials were interchangeable: key leaders in the CGEM were often former ministers or had held other high government positions leading to the direct interpenetration between the state and business: “Rather than creating a dynamic business class, the use of the public sector to nourish private enterprises has made Moroccan entrepreneurs dependent on the state for technical services, fiscal favors, and subsidized loans” (Maghraoui 2001).

Hassan II created a classic *rentier* society in which access to essential resources such as land, labor and capital depended upon political access. In other words, the economic system complimented his general commitment to building a regime based on private goods, whose dissemination depended on private information and limited, private access to the Monarch. Contracts, property trade and education were dispersed at the pleasure of the king, making it difficult to distinguish political from economic elites. Economic elites did not emerge as powers to be contended with in their own right until the reign of Mohammed VI. A more liberal distribution of political rights might have promoted greater rights of entry into more advanced sectors of an economy; instead Hassan II's policies ensured that growth would occur in sectors that were far from its technological capacity. The protection of vested interests and restricted entry meant that Morocco's economy performed very far indeed from the technological frontier.

CONTRACTING THE ELITE SHRUNK THE ECONOMY

Flush with windfall earnings from the tripling of phosphate prices, the government increased public sector spending by several hundred percent. The strategies to strengthen the monarchy's political base of support were built upon unstable economic foundations that were not able to withstand the oil price spike of 1973. The State chose to borrow in the European and other financial markets: foreign debt increased from \$1 to \$10 billion, which eventually led to a debt crisis in the early 1980s when Hassan II's luck began to run out.

The demands of Hassan II's coalition expanded faster than the economic resources generated by the state's import-substitution development strategy. Reliance on export earnings from traditional agriculture and raw materials -- fruits and phosphates -- placed Hassan II's efforts to strengthen Monarchical control over the polity at the whim of world commodity prices. Reliance on natural resource exports and eventually foreign borrowing led ultimately to the debt

crisis of 1981-83. With its finances in disarray by the mid-1990s, King Hassan II and his entourage recognized that the regime's coalitional foundations had to be reconstituted.

The debt crisis and its aftermath, structural adjustment, required a reconstitution of both the coalition and its underlying economic basis, which effectively disappeared in the 1970s. The "short-term" structural adjustment from 1982 through the early 1990s had not (re)created the conditions for reviving it. These programs emphasized cutting public expenditures to reduce domestic demand with the same political consequences as in other patron-client states, fundamentally weakening the resource base for the coalition while intensifying poverty, unemployment and social exclusion.

Unrest spread among the population that had previously been politically neutralized. Neither the political parties nor the institutions were able to give effective voice to this unrest or to contain it, resulting in repeated outbreaks of violence in the streets and growing radicalization. The tensions posed a clear challenge to the political stability and legitimacy of the regime in general and the monarchy and its political allies in particular.

The growing social unrest was unmanageable within Morocco's existing political arrangements and institutions, posing a threat to the sustainability of the monarchy and the overall political stability of Morocco. The Monarch hoped to rebuild an effective governing coalition and hopefully a sustainable economic basis for it. On the expenditure side, the government suffered from a disproportionately high level of wages within government spending, largely due to high compensation rates. This remains true today, despite several years of concerted (and somewhat successful) efforts to reduce them and an early retirement program.

Those who were close to the monarchy resisted attempts to introduce new taxes. For instance attempts at fiscal reforms in 1980 failed due to opposition from influential farmers

which led to tax exemptions to farmers until 2000. This exemption has been extended to the year 2010 by the new King Mohammed VI. It continues to be one of the basic features of the pact between the monarchy and the farming sector.

During the last years of his reign Hassan II undertook reforms in three areas: 1) top-down political reforms and an opening up of electoral institutions to give voice to unrest and to add legitimacy to the regime; 2) an economic strategy to generate sustainable growth by combining economic modernization with greater integration into the world economy; and 3) a reconstituted ruling coalition grounded in export-oriented policies.

When Hassan II died, the pre-existing ruling coalition, centered on the *makhzen* system of patron-client relationships emanating from the monarchy, was in decline. But it created many powerful groups that, today, are well-poised to block regulations, laws and services. The monarchy tried to reconstitute this ruling coalition around export-oriented agriculture and business. The idea was that liberalization of trade and investment would increase the global competitiveness of Morocco's economy to create sustainable growth that would alleviate Morocco's social problems and provide the economic basis to foster political stability. However, the policies of the regime had not equipped the population with the tools to prosper in the new global economic environment. Moreover, the Monarch's attempt towards extending the winning coalition, by supporting export-oriented business and agricultural interests, meant conflict with the elite of the court. As usual, the Monarch thought it could benefit from that conflict. However, the king's relations with the elites were personalistic and he had few institutional links to the broader population. The king had to shift the balance between private and public goods in his budget. He faces a pressures from the population for institutional change. This pressures are likely to grow as liberalization helps groups that are not in the winning coalition to organize and

coordinate. But the king does not have the capacity to provide the level of public goods will satisfy all of the population's demands. This leaves considerable space for a challenger to step in.

ENTER THE KING OF HEARTS: MOHAMMED VI

The young King wanted to create an image of compassion to contrast with the hard strategic persona of his father. This was driven in part by demographic changes, namely: an explosion of new comers and the geographic extension of the economy to provinces that were not included in the support base of Hassan II. Family law was reformed. A moderate religious discourse and a new school for preachers were introduced. For the first time in the Arab world, women preachers were trained and appointed. Training of the clergy was expanded to include management and computer science. An institute for Amazighi culture was put in place as part of a general attempt to deal with cultural rights of Berber "minorities." A commission to look into past human rights abuses was formed and allowed to work freely. A new code for the press was put in place, and a proliferation of media outlets and expansion of freedom of expression resulted. Civil society organizations were encouraged and public funding was allowed to be allocated to non governmental organizations for the first time.

RECOMPOSITION OF THE ELITE

Beginning in the mid 1990s, a number of business-friendly reforms were implemented: the passage of a stock market law, updating the commercial code and creating an investment charter, introduction of commercial courts and increased transparency in government procurement. In international forums the Moroccan government championed free trade, taking a lead role in the Uruguay round of the GATT and in the formation of the WTO.³⁶ The prominent role played by Morocco in these negotiations ultimately led to the selection of Marrakech as the

³⁶ Morocco had joined GATT in 1987 as a condition of one of its structural adjustment programs.

site for the signing ceremonies for the GATT agreement in 1994. In 1995, the government signed Association Agreements with the European Union (to be implemented gradually by 2010), and accelerated the pace of privatization³⁷.

A new business-savvy elite was forming. The monarchy, in its turn, agreed to pursue a neo-corporatist strategy which accelerated the ‘victory’ of outward-looking businesses elites. As Abdallah El Amrani explains in the weekly *La Vérité*, the new economic elites represent, “a great systematic rupture which offers a preview of the Morocco of tomorrow. The rise of private enterprise...and the recomposition of the élite constitutes a profound change in Moroccan society. The reforms undertaken during the last 15 years...has completely altered the playing field for the elites giving rise to new competencies among the unions, the politicians but above all among the managerial class. During the 70s and the 80s, the elites came from the spheres of politics (traditional political Parties) and economics (the majority from the public enterprises with several exceptions from the private sector), the essential direction of the country came from the powerful directors of national enterprises, but the constitution of 1996 opened the economy effectively allowing new elites to affirm their power in ways that were outside of the makhzenian system...The most spectacular change is the emergence of a managerial élite that has benefited from economic opening. The market economy has led to the decline of the public economy and its élites (general directors of national industries).”

THE DILEMMA OF A WEAK STATE: ELITES, THE KING AND SOCIETY

Mohammed VI is continuing the process of incremental adaptation begun by his father and he faces the challenge presiding over a weak state with a weak capacity to tax, or to bring to

³⁷ Perhaps not coincidentally, in early 1995 King Hassan II inaugurated Al Akhawayn University, which was to be a Western-style university with a focus on engineering and business skills. Perhaps with intended irony, it was located in Ifrane, 40 miles from Fez, the heart of the old Fassi business elites.

justice powerful members of the coalition that abuse their rights. He contemplates a framework for reform that supports those institutional changes that are compatible with strong allies of the state. However, conflicts between the old and new elites caused some observers to predict disintegration within the economic *élite* itself. The privatization of public enterprises has fomented competition among the *élite* with close ties to the monopolistic sectors of the state who are accustomed to dealing with the *makhzen*, but also within the private sector. For this new class of entrepreneurs, backed by new or renewed forms of business associations, the neo-corporatist dimension is becoming more important than the clientelistic dimension. Criticism is aired in the business media that the state is interfering in the free market either because it acts on behalf of its own public enterprises (and royal family owned enterprises) or because administrative personnel takes advantage of the bureaucratic structure to favor certain actors according to their relationship with the *makhzen* (Desrues and Moyano 2001, 34-35). It seems that the Monarch seeks a kind of liberalization that allows for the expansion of the winning coalition without diminishing the benefits of incumbents. However, the king risks alienating the new elites by not moving fast enough to open the economy. It will not be easy to move ahead quickly to satisfy new elites while keeping the support of the elites which are still in a situation to subvert or sabotage the reforms.

Additionally, consumer subsidies remain significant and are currently being aggravated by high world food and oil prices. The challenges are more serious on the revenue side. Despite steady efforts to improve tax collection and broaden the tax base, the ratio of government revenues to GDP remain low at around 25%, well below rates of 28-35% for countries with comparable income levels. Morocco has relatively high VAT rates, yet it produces relatively low revenues thanks to poor collection and the large informal sector. Contributing to the revenue

challenge in the future will be declining tariff revenues, as Morocco implements its free trade agreements with the US and EU.

The Monarch faces three risks from the opening of the markets. The king may lose control over the revenues that secure the loyalty of the traditional elites. Access to the international economy leads to the emergence of new groups whose loyalty to the present regime is questionable. A new business elite will challenge the traditional *makzhen*.

Many observers see the most important challenge posed by the new elites is to the monarchy itself which competes with the business elites: it controls many of the leading and most profitable interests and is the gatekeeper for large international groups seeking access to the Moroccan economy. The monarchy is frequently the partner of choice for foreign investors as a vehicle to get around opacity in the legal system and corruption in the courts.

Liberalization has allowed new groups to emerge that are seeking to expand their rights and acquire administrative capacity, which poses a potential threat to the monarchy whose instinct for self-preservation leads it to partner with the new elites. (Business elites occupy many of the leading posts in the government.) But it also seeks to dilute their power by broadening the electoral mandate by aligning itself with the interests of weaker citizens to build a broader base for itself. But the monarchy will have to offer more than just political participation to overcome the extreme disillusionment of the populace, and the growing popularity of Islamist parties that seek to block westernization of the society and to prevent further opening of the economy.

LIBERALIZATION AND THE RISE OF CORRUPTION

Liberalization seems to have launched a new wave of corruption according to perceptions measured by Transparency International and the World Bank. Trying to compensate for the loss of the resources to sustain patron-client politics, the king turned to privatization and

liberalization, which raises questions about the capacity of the state to resist new conflicts of interests. The new elites are accused of using their growing public role to obtain private advantage.

Corruption takes many forms in Morocco, as detailed by Denouex and Payne in their 2007 corruption evaluation of Morocco prepared for USAID. Among their key findings are:

- Illegal activities are tolerated amongst the *makhzen*, especially the military. “Senior members of the armed forces and security agencies, as well as prominent entrepreneurs with close ties to the monarchy (including business partnership ties) frequently benefit from a variety of unfair advantages, including a degree of official tolerance for illicit enrichment.”
- The playing field is not level. “Personal connections to individuals well located in the country’s power structure frequently remain a source of unfair advantages in business transactions. ... proximity to key decision-makers tends to take precedence over the logic of the market.”
- The political and economic interests of the monarchy affect the transparency of transactions and the rule of law. “Whenever the monarchy itself or interests closely tied to it are involved, there is a reduction in the likelihood that transactions will be fully transparent, and that the rules on the book will be respected.”
- The public procurement law passed in 1998 by the reformist USFP administration is not enforced. “... relevant laws, regulations and procedures are applied neither systematically nor consistently. Military contracts are not subject to standard procurement procedures.” In the allocation of contracts for delivery of publicly funded services, “Proper bidding procedures are frequently disregarded, for instance

- The large informal sector has a substantial illegal component to it, including drug trading and smuggling. There is clear evidence that local officials and the judicial system have been corrupted, especially in Northern Morocco, and there are unconfirmed reports implicating the highest levels of the *mahzen* network.³⁸

According to Denouex (2007), magistrates still lack independence relative to powerful political and economic interests, and their rulings are frequently influenced by outside pressures. In addition, judges and lawyers are themselves corrupt; bribery of judges is perceived to be a widespread practice.

Judges are appointed by the King, as noted above, but “promotions and discipline are enforced by a body that is largely appointed by the palace, namely the Conseil Supérieure de la Magistrature. Half of the members of this body are appointed by the King and the Minister of Justice and the other half are elected by judges.” (Denouex and Payne 2003, 65)

This has enormous implications at all levels for the rule of law. Criminal prosecutions are manipulated to protect the politically connected from prosecution, whereas critics and opponents of the regime are harassed. This has been particularly true for the growing evidence of grand and small corruption, where Parliamentary investigations and press exposés can often lead to no action being taken. Perhaps more importantly from a governance perspective: “only

³⁸ As noted above, part of the negotiations between King Hassan and the peak business association, the CGEM, in 1995 included a willingness of the CGEM to pursue corruption internally on the part of its members to engage in its consultative role in helping the government fight corruption. Denouex and Payne ((2007) p.20) suggest that the monarchy is no longer as appreciative of this role as it may have been a decade ago; critical remarks of Moroccan governance in 2005 by the then head of CGEM, Hassan Chami, quickly led to his replacement by Moulay Hafid El-Alamy, who quickly announced that the CGEM would henceforth be less political.

the MOJ [Ministry of Justice] is empowered to act on the reports of control and audit institutions – i.e. only it can trigger an official investigation and legal action once wrongdoings have been determined.” (Denouex and Payne 2003, 37)

This is true of a number of other specific institutions. The central and regional audit courts (*Cour des Comptes*) are designed to supervise and review the expenditures of all ministries and public agencies. However, according to Denouex and Payne, it lacks any independent enforcement authority and its findings are rarely followed up by the judiciary. The Government Auditing Office (*Inspection Générale des Finances*), which is charged with auditing government institutions and other public agencies to provide financial evaluation and oversight in recent years, has uncovered a number of important cases but is understaffed and lacks the capacity to effectively monitor all the institutions over which it has oversight. It has weak enforcement authority and depends on Ministry of Finance to prosecute. The decision to pursue investigations becomes political, resting in the hands of the Minister of Finance. Similarly, both Parliamentary investigations and investigative journalism have uncovered a number of significant cases of corruption, but in most cases the judicial system has failed to act on them.

FATAL ATTRACTION: LIBERALIZATION AND CORRUPTION

Can liberalization increase the scope or speed of Morocco’s transition to fully democratic society with a culture of accountability? The idea that the two are mutually dependent is popular. Many champions of globalization anticipate that competition with indigenous elites exerted through the discipline on private finance will, over time, reduce the influence of corrupt government institutions by creating a constituency for the transparency and predictability of local institutions. But they have not considered the possibility that the process of globalizing the

economy might reclassify the risks of the elite enabling liberalization and corruption to expand together.

Access by the elite to globalized risk management services had unforeseen consequences for the primary domestic institutions within the country. Moroccan elites can gain access to the global system by entering into partnerships with firms that seek profitable ventures in Morocco without improving the effectiveness of the state itself. They can use the risk-mitigating architecture of their partners to gain access to capital and technology without having to build comparable domestic institutions for accountability and innovation domestically. In effect, they are the beneficiaries of a secondary market, one much larger than the local market, reducing the urgency of investing in local risk mitigation.

The rise of the international economy and the elite that is connected to that economy has created a secondary market in which a third party, represented by international institutions or multinational firms, provides insurance from policy and institutional risk within the domestic market. This may have the effect of reducing their incentive to produce these goods locally. At least in the short to medium run international financial institutions can be a substitute for poorly functioning local institutions. Doing business is no easier or less risky for ordinary Moroccans; they are the segment of the population that pay for the new corruption.

These secondary risk contracts are heavily front-loaded and require Westernized degrees and other credentials such as language and negotiating skills within the international system. They involve committing resources for new costs such as providing family members with skills taught only outside of Morocco. As Sater (2002) argues, the new business classes have a different culture, and many of the new generation are U.S.-educated with MBAs. Their investments would be wasted if the international educated group drops out of the international

economy. Hence the westernizers are the new protégés with interests that are sharply divergent from those of the majority population. The job of the king is to co-opt these new protégés of the international economy, to show them their interests are aligned with those of the monarchy. The danger is that their demands for administrative power and rights may increase more rapidly than the monarchy can adapt.

EXPANDING THE WINNING COALITION WHILE BROADENING THE SELECTORATE

The king has appointed many of the new elites into his cabinet, but as they become more prominent they could emerge as a threat. By expanding the coalition the king makes its membership less loyal because the shift towards greater public goods reduces the cost of exclusion from future coalitions. To counter this, the Monarch has attempted to expand the constitutional rights of other groups to prevent a new oligarchy from expanding its administrative power over the government in the same way that his father sought to prevent the urban bourgeoisie from dominating the administration. He has chosen to broaden the “selectorate”, those who have a say over the formation of the government, so that disloyalty by the elite would be more costly. The Socialists and Islamists who are likely to increase their power will stand against an aggressive model of economic liberalization. This makes the Monarch more essential to the elites. One danger the king wants to avoid is rapid economic liberalization that might curtail the power of the Monarch to monopolize the most lucrative sectors of the economy. As always the Monarch claims to be promoting consensus but there are many who suspect that the Monarch is using consensus to prevent debate.

THE POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS AND ITS DANGERS

Mohammed VI is following in his father's footsteps as he liberalizes the political realm in a top-down political opening of guided democracy which includes a greater role for Parliament and other elected bodies, an opening to the historical opposition, and a neo-corporatist style form of consultation with the social partners, particularly the business class. King Hassan II understood that the victory of the monarchy over the nationalist opposition was not "won" once and for all in the 1970s, and needed to be maintained through a continuing mix of repression, co-optation and fragmentation of the opposition. To undercut the nationalist opposition, beginning in the early 1980s King Hassan II encouraged the development of an "illegal" Islamic opposition outside of the electoral system that provided religious and social benefits, appealing to the same mass base as the Left in particular.³⁹

Until the political opening of the mid-1990s, no legal Islamic party existed in Morocco. To bring some of the illegal Islamic opposition into the open, King Hassan II initiated a number of measures to open the political process while ensuring that the democratic forces remained fragmented. The Justice and Development Party (*Parti de la Justice et du Développement* or PJD) was formed from pre-existing parties and movements, and became a moderate Islamic outlet in the 1997 elections. The monarchy and the Ministry of Interior saw it as a vehicle to draw support away from both the nationalist opposition and the more radical Islamic elements. It promotes Islamism and Islamic democracy, criticizes the Westernization of the country and corruption, and at the same time, and most importantly, accepts the King's central religious and political roles. Founded by Dr. Abdelkrim Al Khatib, known for close ties with the monarchy, the PJD

³⁹ The most important of these is the al-Adl wal Ihsahne (Adl) or Justice and Charity Movement. The Adl is a social organization performing charitable activities and advocating for sharia law in Morocco. It is not a political party and therefore does not stand for elections. It denies the religious leadership of the King, does not accept the current political rules of the game including the monarchy. It is led by a charismatic leader, Abdeslam Yassine, who is in his eighties, and his equally charismatic daughter Nadine.

was created out of a merger with several Islamist parties. It was encouraged by Interior Minister Driss Basri, who served for decades under King Hassan II as czar of internal security. The PJD has its base in the poor urban and peri-urban areas of the largest cities, where it offers an alternative to the more radical and illegal Islamic organizations and social movements.

Hassan II initiated another round of constitutional reforms in 1996, with perhaps the most important change being the direct election of the 325-member lower House of Representatives replacing the mixed direct and indirect election method. The king recreated a bicameral legislature⁴⁰ (which had been eliminated in a previous reform) with an indirectly elected 270-seat upper Chamber of Advisers.⁴¹ In the context of the political opening initiated by Hassan II, the agreement to tri-partite negotiations, and the rise of political Islamism encouraged secular parties to align with the monarchy and take part in the 1997 elections. Popular disaffection with the opposition gave way to a renewed hope that this political opening might allow for real change in Morocco.

Not surprisingly, the USFP won the most seats in lower house in the 1997 election (see Table 1 below.) In line with the electoral outcome, King Hassan II named a Socialist, Abdel Rahman Youssefi, to lead a coalition government of six parties drawn from the principal opposition and the administration parties, but without the participation of the PJD. This government was understood to be one of *alternance*, in that it was to manage a transition to democracy and to the next Monarch, as it was recognized that King Hassan II was nearing the end of his life. Its ambitious task was “the reform of the country’s economic, social and political systems.” (Sater (2003) p. 136)

⁴⁰ The original bicameral legislature had been abolished and replaced by a unicameral election with 2/3 direct election and 1/3 appointed in the 1970s.

⁴¹ Seats in the Chamber of Advisers are elected to nine-year terms by a combination of regional, local and professional councils, most of which are directly or indirectly under the control of the monarchy.

DEMOCRACY EXPANDS UNDER MOHAMED VI

Mohammed VI is going further than his father by improving human rights, civil liberties and basic freedoms. A vigorous media and civil society has emerged along with substantial improvements in the status of women. Critics point out, however, that the King has created greater space for electoral democratic institutions without ceding them significant formal power.

The 2002 election was widely acknowledged to be free and fair but resulted in an even more fragmented Parliament, as the election was contested by 26 parties. Perhaps because the 1998-2001 government had little to show for its efforts, the administrative members of the coalition government lost votes while the USFP again won the largest share of the votes with Istiqlal second. Whereas the 1998 government was chosen by King Hassan II, this government was chosen by King Mohammed VI. He decided to appoint a cabinet led by the former Interior Minister, the technocratic Driss Jetou,⁴² along with nine other technocratic ministers. The remaining ministerial posts were allocated to a five-party coalition that was largely the same as the 1998 government, centered on the two opposition parties, the USFP and the Istiqlal.

Some analysts argue that the King deliberately limits the power of the political parties and Parliament, while others argue that it is the weakness of the parties themselves which has forced the King to retain power in the interests of stability and effectiveness. Observers sympathetic to the monarchy have argued that the Youssefi regime's poor performance forced the monarchy to reassess the speed of democratization and try a technocratic government, hoping it would be more effective. Skeptics of the liberalization process argue that the King never intended to sustain a transfer of political power to the elected Parliament and political parties, and deliberately undercut the Youssefi regime to justify continued control from the palace.

⁴² Driss Jetou had been responsible for organizing the successful 2002 elections and previously had held the position as head of the state phosphate monopoly,

Among other evidence, they cite the electoral reforms put through by the political parties in 2002 prior to the election, in which a complicated system of proportional representation guaranteed that the strongest parties did not have an advantage in the election, but instead increased the already substantial fragmentation of political parties (Sater 2003, 135).⁴³

By the 2007 elections, nearly ten years of rule by opposition-led coalitions had generated disappointing results. “Over the last ten years, the coalition governments led by the Socialist Union and the Independence Party have failed to develop credible programs to resolve Morocco’s socioeconomic predicaments. Worse corrupt practices have jeopardized the historical legacy of the Socialist Union and Independence Party as opponents of government corruption.” (Hamzawy 2007, 3).

The Left parties were unable to achieve social gains through the electoral process, negotiations or popular mobilization. They emerged from this period fragmented, ineffective and delegitimized, losing ground to the Islamist organizations in areas characterized by high levels of social exclusion and among the youth. The Islamists campaigned to end widespread corruption and improve social services; since they had not dirtied their hands in government there was no basis upon which to doubt their virtue. The perception of the Socialists, as noted, had already been soiled by their less than impressive track record in delivering services while in power.

The Socialists have a good justification for their failures. In contrast to the rival Istaqilal party, they claim to have taken to the high road of policy reform rather than engaging in patronage. But high-minded policy has proven to offer few tangible outcomes as the civil

⁴³ The system is quite complicated, but essentially parties get allocated one seats based on their total number of votes compared to a minimum quotient needed based on the number of votes cast. However in order to get a second seat in a district, the party’s remaining votes (the difference between its total vote and the quotient), must be greater than the total votes of the next largest party. If not, it take its place in the queue according to the size of its remainder

service is politicized and inept. How the Islamists will get around the civil service, should they come to power, remains to be seen.

Polls prior to the 2007 election strongly suggested that dissatisfaction with the performance of the opposition-led coalitions predicted a sweep for the PJD. This was because the PJD had not participated in the 1998 and 2002 cabinets, and thus was not tainted in the minds of the public by either the poor record of the incumbents, or the perception of co-optation by the monarchy. The number of seats held by the USFP did decline dramatically,⁴⁴ but most of the other participants in the 1998 and 2002 coalitions held their own.

TABLE 1. SEVEN LARGEST MOROCCAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND SEATS WON IN LOWER HOUSE: 1997, 2002 AND 2007 ELECTIONS

Party Abbrev.	Full Name	MPs won in 1997	MPs won in 2002	MPs won in 2007
OPPOSITION PARTIES				
Nationalist Parties				
USFP	Union Socialiste des Force Populaires	57	50	38
PI	Independence Party - Hizb al'Istiqlal	32	48	52
Islamic Party				
PJD	Parti de la Justice et du Développement	12	42	46*
Left Party (of several)				
PPS	Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme	9	11	17
PRO-MONARCHY PARTIES				
Right wing parties				
MNP	Mouvement Nationale Populaire	19	18	Was reunited with the Mouvement Populaire
MDS	Mouvement Démocratique et	32	7	9

⁴⁴ Indeed, it appears that the USFP has increasingly lost its traditional base among the urban, middle-class and ceded students and teachers to the Islamic movement and parties, increasingly becoming “a more rural-based party of ‘notables’”. (Tozy, (2008), p. 40)

	Social			
PND	Parti National-Démocrate	10	7	8
Liberal Center Parties				
MP	Mouvement Populaire	40	27	41
RNI	Rassemblement National des Indépendants	46	41	39
UC	Union Constitutionnelle	50	16	27
<hr/>				
	Total of Above	308	267	288
	Total Seats in Lower Chamber	325	325	325
	Number of Parties participating		26	33
	Participation Rate	58%	52%	37%

* of which 7 seats were won by members of the “national list” for women).

THE MONARCH AS A PRIVATE INTERESTED PARTY

As a way of committing the regime to globalization, the King himself invested in the international system. He made Morocco’s path irreversible, with exit no longer being an option so long as the King could maintain power. The Monarch is involved in holding companies that have assets both within and outside the country, taking advantage of the fact that the expansion of trade has increased the value of the Monarch’s rights. It has raised capital by pairing with local and international investors in overseas opportunities, ensuring that private sector initiatives accord with the interests of the monarchy. The King and his conglomerate are rumored to have investments in almost every major sector in the economy, holding concessions for major foreign brands, such as Danone foods or French automobiles. As Deneoux notes, the monarchy is the largest landowner and main entrepreneur.

“The royal family remains the primary shareholder in Morocco’s largest private conglomerate, ONA-SNI, which controls the distribution of a broad array of goods and equipment in the kingdom, in addition to dominating the agribusiness, financial-services and

mining sectors. In particular, since 2003, the Palace has become even more involved in the economic life of the country either directly and through close associates. The general perception in the kingdom today is that there is more wheeling and dealing by the monarchy itself than before.” (Deneoux 2007 p. 136)

The problem is that the Kingdom’s insertion into the world economy has occurred within the logic of the preexisting environment of elitism, privilege, collusion and exclusion. Globalization has opened the privileges enjoyed by the Monarch to others in a way that pits the king into conflict with members of his own coalition. It brings into sharp relief the conflict between monarchy as an institution and the monarchy as a reflection of the private interests of the royal family.

The Morocco of today is one in which the system of governance can aptly be described as patrimonial, where administrative and military personnel are responsible to the ruler not the electorate. The monarchy has laid the rules of the game and holds the preponderance of political power, ruling through a coalition of elites -- business, rural notables and large landowners, and the military security apparatus. It has nearly unlimited powers under the constitution, particularly the power to appoint key ministers and civil servants, judges, and heads of state enterprises and agencies. The Moroccan constitution, amended numerous times, most recently in 1996, gives the King nearly unlimited formal powers. He is responsible to no one but God, and enjoys the role of Commander of the Faithful, the supreme religious role. This makes his situation very different from political authority in secular states and means he can keep a watchful eye over the political activities of the clergy. He has the power to appoint (and dismiss) the prime minister without taking the election results into account. He presides over the Council of Ministers and has the power to select and appoint the Prime Minister and all government

ministers. He has the power to dissolve Parliament, call new elections, and rule by decree. The King also appoints the heads of parastatals and public enterprises and agencies, which remain significant despite a privatization program which began twenty years ago. He appoints governors, heads of administrative provinces, *walis*⁴⁵, judges and ambassadors. His direct control penetrates fairly far down into the bureaucracy, as he also has the power to appoint the secretaries of state for each ministry. Finally, the King has the power to modify or amend legislation passed by Parliament without resubmitting it for approval.

The Monarch reinforces its formal powers with the informal network of the *mahzen* which is essentially a patron-client pyramid with the monarchy at the pinnacle. As such, accountability in the system is to the monarchy and the *makhzen* rather than to democratic institutions. As Abdallah El Armani wrote in *La Verite*, “For the time being, society is governed by the only coalition that can claim legitimacy; that of the king” (La lecon, *La Verit*, 2008).

VOTER DEFIANCE AND THE DEMOCRATIC IMPASSE

Most political observers agree that the most important factor of the 2007 election was the decline in participation. Participation had already declined from 1997 to 2002 (58% to 52%) as a sign of growing disaffection with the electoral process, and of adherence to calls from Islamist, the extreme left, and Berber associations for a boycott. Voter participation in 2007 declined to a record low of 37%, along with substantial signs of deliberate spoiling of ballots, which led some observers to argue that parliamentary democracy has been thoroughly discredited. Proponents of a more sympathetic view of the Monarch note that King Mohammed VI returned to the practice

⁴⁵ “As part of a 1997 decentralization/regionalization law passed by the legislature 16 new regions (provided below) were created. It is the current highest administrative division of Morocco. Each region is subdivided into 61 second-order administrative divisions, which are prefectures and provinces. A Moroccan region is governed by a Wali, nominated by the King. The Wali is also governor of the province (or prefecture) where he resides.” Souce: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Morocco

of appointing as Prime Minister a representative of the Istiqlal party, which received the most number of seats in the 2007 elections, as his father did in 1997.

The reasons why large segments of the population did not participate has been the subject of discussions, surveys and debates, all of which raise doubts about the quality and validity of the political system. The Monarch was accused of making the legislators irrelevant; taking credit for all change, stealing the thunder from the politicians. In survey after survey, people were reported to say they felt voting was pointless as the monarchy controls power and is held above the ballot box. The parliament can do nothing against a hegemonic and executive monarchy. Why elect a parliament when the essentials of power are found elsewhere?

Among the most interesting debates are those within the Socialist party, which lost a significant percentage of its popular support. The party came to the conclusion that during the election, they put too much emphasis on institutional and constitutional reform. Critics within the party noted that the party is too abstract, too intellectual and too elitist. Najib Akesbi wrote, “We should have popularized our concepts, and simplified our discourse, and tried to be more concrete and closer to the preoccupations of the common citizen. We should have explained in simple and palpable terms such as economy of *rente* to show more clearly the direct relationship between the reform of the constitution and the unemployment of the youth.” (Tredano 2008, 80) In short, the Left (PSU) failed to mobilize popular support by trying to run a principled, programmatic election, in which they distributed their programs throughout the popular quarters of the major cities. Akesbi asked, “Should we do like the others and play on clientelism, money and tribalism in order to become electorally significant? Or should we remain ourselves be condemned to marginality and a piece of theatre which is nothing but a masquerade? We choose the first alternative, we will no longer be ourselves, and we will lose our soul.” (Tredano 2008,

80) Mounir Zouiten and Boulouiz point out that, “Venality is part of the process of exclusion, the organizational festivals, the presiding at family holidays... the false gratuitous distribution of certain services seem to be caring humanitarian action but at their base they contribute to the total disfiguration of the electoral process.” (Tredano 2008, 113) They speculate that candidates who distribute cash create an environment of suspicion in which the electorate rejects even the parties that preach transparency. (Tredano 2008, 113)

Western assessments tend to view political underdevelopment in terms of an absence of institutions for citizens to coordinate against state transgressions. Consequently, the West has a strong tendency to see elections as the essence of the change process. But the fundamental governance issue in Morocco is that administrative power exists outside of state institutions. The formal authority of the state is being nullified by the informal powers of the *makzhen* and the patronage chain it controls that descends to lowest village. As such, few citizens see their well being in terms of rights of representation and voter aggregation.

Parliamentary representation, many Moroccans believe, does nothing to change the system of clientage (*rentes*), which circumvents formal institutions and undermines confidence in institutional roles. Formal political alternatives hardly matter when the absence of clear administrative boundaries or separation of powers makes it difficult to define a separate sphere called the “state of law.”

ANOMIE: THE POLITICAL UNDERCLASS

The political class “can talk about parliaments and rights but the culture of poverty of the villages lacks any conception of these things. To them legislatures, courts, merit-based bureaucracies and constraints on executive authority have no meaning. The distinction between

personal and public patrimony is still unclear, the resources of state are the personal affair of government officials. The language of accountability and transparency has no meaning because the *politiques de la rentes* has emptied politics of any relevance or power to satisfy the needs of the poor. In such an environment the political platform of the parties matters less than the network of social relations cemented by clientage (*rente*) not by formal role playing.”

Mohammed Chiguer concludes “The popular verdict is without nuance: the Parties are all the same (*ouahad*) despite different ideological loyalties, they are all 'the children of the same man.’” (Tredano 2008, 31) The broadening deficit has created a class of citizens that shares little with the discourse of technocratic modernization and reform being championed by the Monarch.

Figure 3

Question-How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?





Figure 4

Question-Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?



Source: World Value Survey (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>)

Mounir Zouiten and Boulouiz write that what the elections really reveal are the deep social fragmentation of the Moroccan society. “The population in question formed of families and individuals are an underclass. Situated at the bottom of social hierarchy, it lives in a state of anomie characterized by a failure of a system of integration and a process of socialization. The population is for the most part illiterate, under schooled, and lives from day-to-day. Work which procures revenue, stability identity and social relations, in fact an integrator, is completely absent. The second agent of integration, the state, that provides assurance is also absent. In this milieu, the association of this civil society, rare and ephemeral, has very little impact on daily life of population. In this context, it is the family that remains the last rampart against exclusion and marginalization. There is the disaffection of the majority of the population from the political

discourse. The absence of a mechanism for social integration produces a situation of weak social participation” (Tredano 2008, 112).

Anomie is fuel for Islamism because it means that rather than seek gratification in the language of secular modernization a large part of the population see the issues facing Morocco in moral terms as a choice between good and bad, placing the debate in the language which the Islamists are best suited to address.

FUTURE OPTIONS

The Monarch is pursuing several contradictory goals at once. These include to co-opt or “*makhzenise*” the political elite, to neutralize and divide the left, and to keep the Islamists from mobilizing the population and grabbing power. A political underclass now absorbs much of the Monarch’s attention in that it must find a way to prevent the Islamists to tap into and build an electoral base by which it can come to power, as occurred in neighboring Algeria. These multiple strategies keep the opposition off-balance but also raise serious concerns about where the country is going. All of the traditional systems are unhinged. The elite is divided between globalizers and traditional courtiers whose system of privilege emanates from access to the court. The system of clientage is also breaking down at the village level. Today locals feel left out by the rise of the new moneyed power brokers who are edging in on their turf. In the local consultative councils, wealthy interlopers are able to win local elections, pushing out the traditional village elites. The final dilemma is this: The monarchy seeks to modernize and democratize in its own name, seeking all of the credit, but it does not seem prepared to accept the consequences that if reform is successful it will make the monarchy and the *makhzen* irrelevant.

CONCLUSION:

Since the financial crisis of the eighties the monarchy has gradually oriented its spending towards public goods. This diminishes the King's personal welfare and that of his entourage. Their discretionary control over the budget is reduced as they are now compelled to spend more of their revenue to satisfy the demands of a coalition that includes a larger representation from the public. The result is that the monarchy can no longer make budgetary allocations with only its own welfare in mind. With fewer resources to buy off or co-opt opposition groups the monarchy is in a very vulnerable situation. The welfare of the *makzhen*, its ability to hold on to power, is significantly diminished. Challenges to its authority appear daily in the media, among the public and in scholarly discussion, and most dangerously in the radical discourse of the religious fundamentalists. Unlike the oil rich regimes in the MENA region the King of Morocco does not have natural resources to increase the distribution of private goods and thereby survive threats by reducing the size of the winning coalition. There is only one option at this point which is to increase public goods that will provide incentives for the population to engage in productive behavior. An essential component of the new survival strategy is administrative modernization. External donors can contribute significantly to the modernization process the Monarch has initiated by supporting the process of administrative reforms. That process will be defined in the next section.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS

In the past several years the government of Morocco has initiated a number of political and economic reforms to restructure the economy and the society. But the monarchy faces a challenge that the critical reforms depend upon improving the effectiveness of the public administration.

The monarchy is trying to reform politics and economics simultaneously. The modernization of the civil service will be an essential component to both reforms. The Monarch is also intending a genuine devolution of power to local level officials. Then again, the success of the devolution depends on civil service reforms. Regardless of whether Morocco chooses a top-down or bottom-up approach the capacity of the public administration to respond will be critical.

At present the government has not committed sufficient resources to move the reform process quickly enough to meet the challenge of lagging labor market growth and rising extremism. Moreover there is lukewarm public enthusiasm for modernization and there is insufficient confidence that the reforms will succeed. This is because reforms are yet to touch people's lives, they have yet to reach the countryside or the poor neighborhoods of major cities, and they have yet to surmount the barriers to intergovernmental communication. If the reforms fail to work the entire Moroccan system of administration will be in perpetual crisis.

The reforms are very promising and until they succeed the King's promise to devolve power to the public will be unfulfilled. Although responsibility for the success of the reforms lies with the government of Morocco the U.S. can play a helpful role by sharing its expertise and helping to disseminate the necessary skills widely among the administration. In this report we suggest a comprehensive pilot project to be undertaken within a single Ministry and within a single district so that a broad based learning process can take place that can be used as a model or prototype for other government ministries. So far the government of Morocco has responded enthusiastically to promises of assistance. It is in the long term interest of both the Moroccan government and the U.S. for modernization of the state to succeed for it will help to sustain economic growth, moderation, and pluralism.

Because the Moroccan state at independence was very weak, the governments of Hassan II and Mohammed VI tended to rely on informal systems of social control. This resulted in an insufficient capacity to mobilize national resources and it created deep social divisions that have fueled growing Islamist sentiments. Unable to reach low income communities and unable to support entrepreneurialism, development has led to social fragmentation in which the underlying inequalities have been exacerbated. Because of administrative weaknesses the government has been unable to manage the social problems. Instead of facilitating the response of citizens to their own needs the Monarch tightened its control over political participation and diversity.

In order to surmount the legacy of patronage based politics and to eliminate the causes of radicalization the capacity of public administration must be dramatically enhanced. If the government cannot ensure that its decisions are carried out and that its policies are effectively implemented, its fundamental legitimacy will be in doubt.

Modernization is a long term solution for the problems of the disaffected, unemployed youth and the neglected regions of the country and the underserved sectors of the population. But no single strategy for alleviating the social problems of development will succeed until the institutional reforms and the modernization of the civil service has been undertaken.

Eventually modernization will allow more open markets and allow the state to retreat from its present controlling role. Until modernization has been successfully implemented, there will be inadequate progress on social issues which will weaken the appeal of the market driven model that the government has chosen.

Today the government of Morocco has the capacity to formulate national development policies but it does not have the tools to ensure that the entire population benefits from these policies. The strategies that we will suggest in this report will increase government efficiency

while diminishing the prevalence of patronage and corruption. It will also promote the active involvement of parliament and civil society in monitoring the reform process. The modernization of the government bureaucracy is an essential part of the institutional reforms needed to support market functioning and to promote social capital.

Morocco's Public Sector Modernization Program

The Government of Morocco (GOM) began a Public Sector Modernization program in 2003, anchored on reforms that can assist the administration to improve the management of its resources and foster greater transparency and accountability. The modernization program is intended to enhance both effectiveness and efficiency by introducing performance-based budgeting and applying performance measures to all levels of public administration. By adopting performance-based budgeting, the GOM will ensure that its revenues and expenditures are tied to strategic priorities and will permit increased managerial autonomy of line agencies.

A comprehensive reform of staffing procedures is planned, including measures to link remuneration with performance. As a corollary, rules for performance auditing will be adopted. This process of rationalizing the public sector management is intended to include a consolidated and controlled reduction of the public payroll and increased the use of e-government in public service delivery. The budget and all supporting documents, including performance contracts with ministers, must be submitted and approved by the Parliament. A digital procurement system should be established to ensure competitive bidding for all government activities.

The modernization program already has strong constituent support from economic who see it as a complement to improving the competitiveness of private enterprise. The reforms can also play a critical role in the battle against poverty, and can help to increase medical coverage and improve education.

Recommendations:

We recommend that USAID collaborate with the GOM to design a multiphase, multi-scenario program at the sectorial and sub-national level.

A pilot phase may be carried out to in one designated sector across several regions to compare the effects of different performance enhancement scenarios, such as management autonomy, training and levels of performance incentives. Geographical and/or sectorial roll-out will follow once the pilot program identifies winning reform scenarios.

In designing the sub-national level reform program, we recommend that USAID take into consideration the components of the existing national-level reform programs GOM is running in collaboration with the EU and the World Bank.

Rationales: A “design of experiment” approach will:

- a. Allow multiple scenarios and assess their individual impact on factors such as management autonomy, compared to performance incentives
- b. Help identify key success drivers by comparing results in the test sector and/or region to control sectors/regions.
- c. Reduce cost and risk to society: This approach will be akin to China’s model of development in which regions were allowed to experiment locally before successful techniques were eventually mainstreamed. This approach will allow for more local content in training and it will be more effective at identifying operational hurdles on the ground. One of the disadvantages of the top-down approach is that it will take many years before the regions will see the relevance of the program. Presently, there is considerable skepticism at the regional level.

PERFORMANCE BASED BUDGETTING:

Performance-based budgeting will focus on outcomes and impact, providing ministries and agencies greater latitude to accomplish their missions and will provide managers more autonomy and accountability in designing and executing sector-level programs and activities. Tools that link budgeting to performance will pave a path that goes from improved accountability, to regional- and staff-level autonomy to greater efficiency.

The following work plan is envisioned:

Phase One: Introduce a multi-year budgeting perspective (*Cadre de Dépense à Moyen Terme: CDMT*) and performance management frameworks and disseminate the necessary tools and training to leading officials of key government ministries. The *CDMT* will aim to reflect policies and strategies of the government and engage the attention and oversight of the Parliament. The *CDMT* gives ministers a view of budgetary resources in terms of macro-economic indicators. It is not a substitute for planning and it does not replace existing financial controls.

All government ministries and agencies will receive training in the preparation of medium-term expenditure frameworks. This would include the creation a of triennial table of the state's financial operations on a rolling basis, with aggregated receipts and expenses projected over three years, and with projections by the ministry of the resources at its disposal to finance sectorial programs including salaries, material and investments. Multi-year sector budget ceilings should take into account intra- and inter-sector priorities. Skills in formulating medium-

term budgets must include the ability to establish rolling or regularly updated revisions that are transparent to all stakeholders.

Phase Two: Seek to establish performance indicators for all government agencies. All ministries must be required to and capable of publishing performance indicators that are consistent with the strategic vision of performance established in the multi-year framework. The line ministries should be capable of producing a clear and manageable set of performance indicators for the major expenditure programs in consultation with users. Their expenditures should be linked to a strategic framework that specifies the standards of performance and monitoring of deliverables. The ministries must be given the tools to develop and adopt performance measures that can be used in consultation with the Prime Minister and ultimately with the Parliament. In moving toward a culture of results and of performance measures, administrators must think in terms of consequences and eventually of sanctions.

Each sector requires different measures of performance that are sector-specific yet sufficiently general so that they will not be too complex to measure and compare over time. The process of creating indicators requires conceptual skills in assessing what a sector delivers and statistical skills to ensure that proper standards of measurement are maintained. It also requires institutional capacity to ensure that the measurements are isolated from political or ministerial-level interference. Some governments have made performance monitoring a responsibility of a single, stand alone agency that reports directly to the head of government or to the parliament.

The U.S. government required more than one year to complete work on its indicators for the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Some government ministries in developing countries have required three years to complete the exercise. So far the results are encouraging but mixed. The World Bank reports: “The preliminary performance indicators are too numerous (more than

1,400) and often fail to provide a strategic vision of performance and achievement of objectives. Closer consultation between MEF and line ministries is critical for converting them into a manageable, clear and monitorable set of performance indicators for the major expenditure programs, with participation from frontline staff and users, and a clear division of responsibilities on who does what to support the M&E system. There is also a need to improve performance reports. The Government has decided to put together a working group to work in-depth on improving the selection and choice of indicators, establish the standards for their information systems, and improve the quality of performance reports (World Bank, 2008: 15).”

Phase Three: The third and final stage is the deconcentration of the budget to support contractualization between the central administration and deconcentrated services. Budgetary deconcentration will offer line-level officials more responsibility for results by giving them the tools to reward and punish staff on the basis of objective performance standards. These can be indicators of productivity, such as the miles of roads achieved by the Ministry of Construction; indicators of efficiency such as the cost of each liter of water, indicators of impact such as the cost of educating a school girl. Indicators of outcomes can indicate the number of students that found employment in a specific sector or the number of children inoculated, or the mortality rate for mothers.

This phase will focus on monitoring and analyzing the performance of agencies. It will assess if performance-based budgeting is facilitating greater budget flexibility and will entail assigning greater responsibility in budgetary programming and execution to line level ministries and to regional and branch offices. At this stage budgetary documents should be written in terms of coherent programs including the elaboration of statistical indicators, the progressive fungibility of credits and the elaboration of annual performance indicators and procedures for

evaluation. This is the essential step that will allow the shift from *a priori* to *a posteriori* financial audit.

The final goal is to increase the autonomy (*marge de manoeuvre*) of the officials and making them responsible for agreed upon outputs measured by performance indicators. In order to attain these objectives the government must overcome numerous obstacles. First because of a hiring freeze retraining of existing staff will be necessary. The introduction of performance based budgeting can be used to ensure an orderly decline in the wage bill, which is essential to enable the GOM to free up resources, recruit and retain capable personnel, and focus on results. To expedite the process the government will have to consider recruitment of staff on a contract basis. It also must be prepared to improve remuneration so that staff once trained will remain within the civil service. A new system of evaluation must be put in place so that the recently trained officials can be properly remunerated for helping to disseminate the new skills effectively throughout their units.

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:

These phases toward greater effectiveness and efficient in public sector management should be undertaken in accord with a renovated system of job classification.

Staffing frameworks must be strategic and include job descriptions for all government positions and annual performance reviews for all staff. Performance objectives will be introduced as the basis of staff hiring and evaluation, and should be linked to the reduction of the wage bill. The downsizing of the government should be part of the process that will include documented job descriptions for all government employment that are linked to a performance criterion for recruitment and promotion.

CURRENT LEVELS OF SUPPORT:

This reform has the support from the highest levels of both the state and from the managerial elite of the business sector. But communication within the administration within sectors and cross regions is less positive. There are many administrative silos or stove piping within the administration that perpetuate compartmentalization and prevent communication.

Private sector leaders say that progress must be aggressive and that it must be combined with the battle against corruption. They also say that in order for the administration to work correctly the justice department must be strengthened, its staff better trained and its processes computerized. At present the administrative modernization is divorced from the reforms of the justice department and is not directly connected to decentralization.

Currently confidence in the process lags because only a minority of officials seem committed to reforms. There is only limited awareness of the reform project among provincial administrators. It is conceived of only within the context of ministry specific deconcentration. Yet even in this limited context enthusiasm among senior administrators for deconcentration is weak because the skills for performance management are being diffused slowly and unevenly.

A ROLE FOR USAID:

Ultimately none of these exercises will have meaning until a culture of results pervades an organization from the bottom up and top down. For the system to become operational the following criteria must be met. Ministries must have capacity for multi-year budgeting based upon results and upon measureable inputs and outputs which must be consistent with the vision of government for the future. Administrative deconcentration is necessary before this system will begin to show results. Thus the capacity to evaluate and audit must pervade an entire sector or region from top to bottom and must be sector wide. What is required is a culture change.

The government's plans are to begin at the center and to slowly devolve capacity once a ministry has met certain performance benchmarks at the center. The idea is based on a train the trainers' model and envisions high level competency at the top of the administrative hierarchy that is gradually devolved to lower levels within a single ministry. However meaningful results will not be visible until the necessary tools and skills pervade an entire sector. At present the government does not have the resources to achieve this level of coordination

The need for a coordinated outcome is recognized by the government but currently it does not have the resources to undertake such a change in timely fashion. To implement these ambitious plans the government has received support from the World Bank and the European Commission. The skills that are required to make one official proficient in performance based budgeting require about one year of training. At present the government is receiving sufficient resources to train about thirty officials a year. As of now 15 departments which manage about 40% of the budget of the state have produced indicators while 6 other departments are expected to have indicators by year end (2008). The quality of indicators is essential and it will take many more rounds before the quality indicators are available. At this rate the dissemination of skills will be slow and uneven. The new processes will not have meaning to the citizenry until they take root in the deconcentrated service delivery mechanisms.

The measures of performance must take into account not only the resources that are budgeted but also the consequences for stakeholders at all levels. By working within a sector or regional framework the dissemination of results based management tools will enable the center to establish partnerships with local administrations, professional associations, civil society, the private sector and local government.

It is recommended that USAID and other donors consult with the GOM to help reduce social and geographic disparities to develop pilot projects that link an entire sector such as Agriculture and Education and that link the center with the regions. It also recommends working with the government to pilot results based system to an entire sector in a single region. Focusing on one sector in one region to introduce the new budgetary management and to construct a new human resource management system is more likely to induce the necessary culture change.

To modernization of public administration the necessary accounting skills must be widely disseminated throughout the government before a change of motivations and expectations will occur within the culture of government organizations. The process will be concluded only once contracts can be written in which goals and means are assessed on a rolling three year basis giving local managers the room to make relevant decisions based on meeting locally targeted objectives assessed via annual performance reviews. Everything rests on an ability to identify and reward results.

The government acknowledges the importance of a global approach that integrates the entire planning and budgetary process. But it states that the reforms will be adapted progressively according to the capacity of various ministries; some ministries have taken a lead in pioneering the new methods. Health in particular has been receptive. The government of Morocco anticipates that at the present rate it will take ten to fifteen years to show significant nation wide progress. Yet successful modernization programs generally have taken no more than three years (i.e. the transformation of Korea's system under Park Chung Hee in the sixties, New Zealand in the eighties was essentially completed in three years). Successful modernization requires the complete attention of the head of state and it is unlikely that the executive will be able to focus attention on the process or claim credit for it if it is not condensed into a few years

of intense effort. When the reforms are too diffuse it is more difficult to make all the moving parts work together.

Putting into place a reliable system of measurements requires both skills and the insulation of statistical units of government from political manipulation.

As Morocco develops a democratic and parliamentary culture risk exists that performance measures will be politicized. It is necessary to envision such risks and erect constitutional barriers such as a strong independent civil service commission, an independent civil service commissioner that reports directly to the head of government and carries the status equal to that of a member of parliament.

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